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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic Crisis and Reserve System Response, 1929-1932 
The autumn of 1929 brought the collapse of the New York stock market 
and the beginning of the decade during which Federal Reserve policy was 
subjected to its most critical test. The contemporary consensus is that 
the System failed this test miserably. It is contended that Federal 
Reserve policy during various phases of the depression was characterized 
by inaction, by unjustifiably slow and insufficient action, or by action 
in the wrong direction in the face of rapidly deteriorating conditions. 
In this thesis, attention will be focused on monetary policy during one of 
the most critical periods of the depression decade, and in particular on 
the analysis of that policy presented by two of the System's most influ­
ential critics. Professors Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (18). The 
interval to be considered is the period between Britain's abandonment of 
the gold standard on September 21, 1931, and the passage of the Glass-
Steagaii Act on February 27, 1932. 
System officials regarded their policy during the first two years 
following the "great crash" as one of easy money. The discount rate, the 
traditional tool of monetary control, had been reduced from 6 percent at 
the New York Bank in October, 1929, to 2 1/2 percent by late June, 1930. 
In May It stood at 1 1/2 percent, an unprecedentedly low level. Open 
market operations, whose usefulness as a policy weapon was a more recent 
discovery, were also utilized. During the last quarter of 1929, Reserve 
Bank holdings of government securities rose from $160 million to $510 
million. An additional $220 million was purchased during 1930. Buying 
2 
rates on acceptances at the Reserve Banks were subjected to successive 
reductions from the fall, 1929 level of 5 1/8 percent until they reached 
an all-time low of 1 percent in May, 1931.^  In spite of these policies, 
and an inflow of gold amounting to $700 million during 1930 and the first 
half of 1931, member bank reserves and the money stock declined. Liquidity 
crises, characterized by bank suspensions and conversion of deposits into 
currency, occurred during the last quarter of 1930, and, with much greater 
severity, in the spring of 1931. Hopes for a revival in early 1931 were 
cut short by this second banking crisis, and economic indicators acceler­
ated their downward trend. 
The summer of 1931 saw the collapse of the credit structure in Central 
Europe which culminated in the British departure from gold in September. 
Austria's largest bank, the Credit Anstalt, failed in May, and during 
June and July the crisis spread to Germany. On July 13, the entire 
German banking system was closed by decree. The Standstill Agreements of 
August, 1931, under which foreign short-term creditors agreed not to 
withdraw balances for six months, did not prove to be a remedy. German 
banks reopened, but Britain, who with the U. S. was the principal short-
term creditor of Germany, was in a precarious position. Her short-term 
assets were immobilized and a large volume of foreign funds were held on 
deposit in London which could be demanded at any time. The extension of 
credits to Britain by the Federal Reserve System was of little help, for 
the trickle of withdrawals from London developed into a torrent, and on 
September 21, that bulwark of Europe suspended the gold standard- The 
Scandinavian countries and a number of others followed suit in 1931 and 
T^he System was not given the power to alter reserve requirements 
until 1935. 
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1932, and in nations where the gold standard was maintained, the adoption 
of rigid controls on foreign exchange transactions was common. 
The United States was not to escape the effects of this crisis. Fear 
that the world-wide demise of the gold standard was underway led to gold 
withdrawals from the U. S., beginning immediately after the British 
suspension. In the six weeks following the announcement from London, the 
U. S. lost $725 million in gold — up to that time, the largest movement 
for a similar period ever experienced by any nation. By June, 1932, the 
total gold outflow had risen to $1.1 billion. These difficulties were 
soon compounded by others. The public, frightened by the external drain, 
intensified the internal drain. During September and October, half a 
billion dollars in currency was withdrawn from banks; by the end of the 
year, $200 million more had been converted from deposits to currency. 
Bank suspensions rose at an alarming rate. 
Monetary authorities have drawn much fire for their policy during 
these catastrophic months. Their initial response to the gold drain was 
the traditional one — discount rates were increased, the rate at the 
New York Bank going to 3 1/2 percent on October 16. There was little ques­
tion about this policy — it was the response expected of sound central 
banks faced with an external drain, even when this problem was accompanied 
by an internal crisis. The advice of Bagehot (7) on this point had been 
carefully adhered to for generations: 
" ... periods of internal panic and external demand commonly 
occur together. The foreign drain empties the Bank till, and 
that emptiness and the resulting rise in the rate of discount 
tend to frighten the market." (7, p. 56) 
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To treat "this compound disease," the Bank "must raise the rate of 
interest as high as may be necessary" to stop the foreign drain of gold, 
and "at the rate of interest so raised it must lend freely." (7, p. 56) 
British, as well as American, policy in 1931 had followed this dictum, 
the Bank rate rising from 2 1/2 to 4 1/2 percent during July, the first 
month of gold withdrawals. 
In addition to making discounting more costly, the Reserve Banks 
raised their buying rate on acceptances by successive steps until it 
reached a high of 3 1/8 percent in November, The System also purchased 
government securities, but the size of the open market operations during 
the latter part of 1931 was very puny in light of the critical banking 
situation — only $90 million were bought between August and the end of 
the year. 
System officials and their defenders have contended that sizeable 
open market purchases were impossible during the period from the British 
suspension until February, 1932, when the Glass-Steagall Act was passed. 
The restraining factor was, they claimed, the free gold position of the 
Federal Reserve Banks. Free gold was defined as total reserves of the 
Reserve Banks less all legal reserve and collateral requirements against 
Federal Reserve notes and deposit liabilities. These requirements 
included a 40 percent reserve against Federal Reserve notes in circu­
lation, a 35 percent reserve against deposits, and 100 percent collateral 
in the form of gold or eligible paper against Reserve notes issued to 
Reserve Banks. Any gold held as collateral could also be counted as part 
of the 40 percent reserve, however. Therefore, with sufficient holdings 
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of eligible paper, 60 percent of Federal Reserve notes could be collat-
eraled with this paper and the collateral requirement would add nothing to 
gold requirements.^  When eligible paper was not available to this extent, 
however, it was necessary to substitute gold as collateral, and free gold 
dropped correspondingly. 
Collateral requirements became important in the fall of 1931. The 
level of free gold had declined from approximately $1 billion at the time 
of the stock market crash to $600 million in the fall of 1931, due mainly 
to the rise in currency hoarding and to a dramatic reduction in member 
bank borrowing. Hence, there were more notes to be covered and less 
eligible paper available with which to cover them. The proportion of 
notes collateraled by gold rose, and free gold was depleted. The crisis 
in late 1931 put new strains on free gold from external and internal 
sources. The gold drain diminished the reserves of Reserve Banks, and 
the excessive demand for currency increased Federal Reserve notes in 
circulation. In spite of rapid rise in discounting as banks struggled 
for liquidity that season, free gold dropped to $416 million on February 
24, 1932. 
The System maintained that had large open market purchases been under­
taken in the fall and winter of 1931, member banks would have used the 
proceeds to repay indebtedness, and perhaps would have sold fewer accep­
tances to Reserve Banks. The resulting decline in eligible paper would 
have necessitated the holding of more gold collateral, and might have 
T^his is only approximately correct. See Chapter 2. 
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resulted in the complete elimination of free gold. Furthermore, the last 
of the French short-term balances were not withdrawn until June, 1932, but 
in forming policy during late 1931, Reserve officials had to take into 
account the possibility that they might be taken home as gold at any 
time. This would have subjected free gold to an even greater strain. 
The passage of the Glass-Steagall Act on February 27, 1932, according 
to monetary officials, made possible the easy money policy which had 
previously been infeasible. Under the provisions of this law, the Federal 
Reserve Board was authorized, until March, 1933, to permit the use of 
government securities as collateral for Federal Reserve notes. Therefore, 
even if purchases of governments by the Reserve Banks were followed by 
an equivalent reduction in discounting, the volume of paper available for 
use as collateral would now be undisturbed. Consequently, the free gold 
position would not deteriorate due to open market purchases unless currency 
in circulation or some other determinant of free gold were adversely 
affected. 
Within the week after the Glass-Steagall bill became law, the System 
embarked on a large program of open market purchases, initially at the 
rate of $25 million a week, and later at the vastly increased rate of 
$100 million per week. The campaign ended in August, by which time 
Reserve Bank holdings of government securities had risen by over $1 
billion. The target of monetary policy had by this time become the main­
tenance of excess reserves at a level of $250 to $300 million, and due to 
an influx of currency and expansion of the gold stock during the second 
half of 1932, this level was maintained without any further purchases. 
Hence, the program came to a close. 
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It is clear that prior to September, 1931, it was technically possible 
for the monetary authorities to have pursued a more vigorous course. Free 
gold was close to $1 billion throughout most of this period, and gold 
stocks were rising. It is highly unlikely that even open market purchases 
at the 1932 rate would have made the free gold position untenable. With 
the advantage of hindsight, it is also obvious that a more vigorous policy 
was sorely needed. In spite of the actions taken to ease conditions, the 
money stock, prices and incomes continued their descent, and the unemploy­
ment rate soared upward. 
In defense of the molders of monetary policy, however, it must be 
conceded that by the standards of their day, they had been far from 
passive. Discount and bill buying rates were slashed to the lowest levels 
which had ever been known to that time. Although the rate of purchase 
of government securities is dwarfed by a comparison with the operations of 
today, it was enormous for that time. "There has never been an operation 
as big ... in this country, or in any country," asserted the Governor of 
the New York Reserve Bank (47, p. 500). 
The Severity of the Free Gold Problem; 
The Views of Friedman and Schwartz 
Professors Friedman and Schwartz (18) contend that even during the 
critical period after the British abandoned the gold standard, free gold 
imposed no real constraint on Federal Reserve policy. "Despite the 
attention it has since received," state these authors, "we do not believe 
a shortage of free gold exerted any major influence on Federal Reserve 
policy for five reasons." (18, p. 401) 
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"(1) The earliest published full-dress discussion of free gold 
during the 1929-33 contraction we have found is an article 
by Benjamin Anderson in the Chase Economic Bulletin of 
September 29, 1930." (18, p. 401) 
The article warned of a potential shortage of free gold, but 
there is no evidence that it exerted any influence on System 
officials, explain Friedman and Schwartz. 
"(2) The earliest unpublished System document on free gold is 
a memorandum by Goldenweiser, written on January 3, 1930 
The memorandum makes clear that the Reserve System regu­
larly kept track of free gold, and that its level was not 
at the time a source of concern to the Board." (18, p. 401) 
Other memoranda reinforce the impression that the System did 
not regard free gold as a serious limitation on its alterna­
tives, even during September and October, 1931. "Hence the 
actual amount of free gold throughout the whole period was 
sufficient to have permitted extensive open market operations." 
(18, p. 402) 
"(3) While free gold was alluded to from time to time at meet­
ings of the [Open Market Policy] Conference or of its 
executive committee or of the Federal Reserve Board or 
of the New York Bank directors, it was almost always 
mentioned as a problem by persons who had opposed open 
market operations all along on other grounds; it was 
never given as the principal argument against purchases, 
and the objections raised on this score almost always were 
immediately countered by figures showing that a shortage 
of free gold offered no serious limitation to policy. It 
is impossible to read in full the record of proceedings 
of the Open Market Policy Conference and of meetings of 
the New York Bank directors during the period from 
September 1931 through February 1932 and assign great 
significance to free gold as a factor determining 
policy." (18, pp. 402-03) 
"(4) If free gold had been a serious handicap to a desired 
policy, feasible measures fully consistent with past 
policies of the System were available, even during the 
height of the gold drain, to relieve the free gold 
problem." (18, p. 404) 
These included certain bookkeeping adjustments, namely the 
reduction of Federal Reserve notes in the tills of the issuing 
Reserve Banks against which collateral was required; the 
purchase of bills, which were eligible as collateral, rather 
than government securities; and the encouragement of member 
bank borrowing. 
9 
"(5) Finally, nia enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act 
entirely remrved the problem of free gold. Yet ... its 
enactment did not lead to a change in Federal Reserve 
policy. The large scale open market operation of 1932 was 
begun six weeks later primarily because of Congressional 
pressure and was allowed to lapse not long after Congress 
adjourned." (18, p. 406) 
"The conclusion seems inescapable that a shortage of free 
gold did not in fact seriously limit the alternatives 
open to th& System. The amount was at all times ample to 
support large open market purchases. A shortage was an 
additional reason, at most, for measures adopted primarily 
on other grounds. The removal of the problem did not of 
itself lead to a change of policy. The problem of free 
gold was largely an ex post justification for policies 
followed, noc an ex ante reason for them." (18, p. 406) 
Friedman and Schwartz go even farther and suggest the specific alter­
native which the monetary authorities should have pursued between August, 
1931 and January, 1932 — a purchase of $1 billion in government securi­
ties. A series of assumptions as to the repercussions of this policy on 
discounts, bills bought, and deposit ratios allow them to conclude that 
"an open market purchase of that size would have been adequate" (18, p. 399) 
to prevent the 12 percent decline in the money stock which occurred 
during that interval. 
Objectives of This..Study 
The purpose of this thesis will be to investigate the quantitative 
aspects of the free gold problem which arise from the Friedman-Schwartz 
analysis. We will at^ .aapt to answer three questions: 
(1) Was the amount of free gold ample, as Friedman and Schwartz 
assert, to support a $1 billion purchase of government securities? 
(2) To vAiat extent wa." it possible for the System to exploit the 
alternatives described under Point 4 above? How much relief to the free 
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gold position could have been obtained from the reduction of counter cash 
in the Reserve Banks, purchases of acceptances, and from the encouragement 
of discounting? 
(3) Would an open market operation of the size suggested by Friedman 
and Schwartz have been sufficient to maintain the money stock at a constant 
level? 
We will discuss in a concluding chapter, but only in a rather cursory 
manner, the reasons given by Friedman and Schwartz in Points 1,2,3 and 5 
for their belief that free gold was no insurmountable barrier to policy. 
An evaluation of these points will necessarily be on a more subjective 
level, since they involve the state of the Federal Reserve mind. However, 
it is not our primary purpose here to determine the extent of Federal 
Reserve anxiety over the free gold position, but rather to investigate the 
degree to which such anxiety would have been justified for monetary 
authorities who were extremely desirous of pursuing a large open market 
purchase program in late 1931. 
The Severity of the Free Gold Problem: 
Opinions of Other Authorities 
The general consensus among those who have written on the free gold 
problem, and particularly among those Wio wrote during the depression, has 
been that collateral requirements did indeed impose a serious constraint 
to the initiation of an easy money policy in the fall of 1931. One funda­
mental basis for agreement among most of these authors was lAiat we will 
term the need theory of borrowing, first coherently expounded by Winfield 
Riefler (37) and later by Burgess (12), According to this view, member 
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bank borrowing is inelastic with respect to the discount rate. Banks will 
not borrow simply to lend at a higher rate. The tradition against 
borrowing has been too strongly reinforced in the banking mind for this. 
Bank borrowing occurs in response to need. Hence: 
" ... vAien a member bank receives a Federal Reserve check, put 
into the market through the purchase of government obligations, 
that bank will ordinarily use the check to liquidate borrowings 
from the Federal Reserve Bank rather than use it for a further 
extension of credit. In case the member bank receiving the 
check is not in debt at the Reserve Bank and therefore employs 
the funds by purchasing additional investments or making addi­
tional loans, the extra amount of credit thus put into the 
market usually finds its way promptly to some bank which is in 
debt at the Reserve Bank. Thus, the usual effect of a purchase 
of government securities by the Reserve Banks has been a corre­
sponding reduction in the borrowing of member banks. The action 
has the effect, not of increasing the volume of credit, but 
rather of easing the pressure on the banks." (12, p. 236) 
Therefore, even had the discount rate not been raised in 1931, those 
adhering to this view believed that open market purchases would be 
accompanied by a sharp reduction in member bank discounting, and perhaps 
in acceptances sold to the Reserve Banks, and hence in free gold. That 
free gold was too slight to bear this additional strain was accepted as a 
matter of course. Some who wrote during the depression era were not 
overly disturbed by the existence of this constraint, for they were 
opposed to the extensive use of open market operations and/or to the use 
of government securities as collateral for Federal Reserve notes. Most 
writers, however, would have favored a change in the law and an easy money 
campaign at an earlier date. 
Years later, three men who had been Reserve System officials during 
the 1930's expounded their views on the severity of the free gold problem 
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during the critical months of 1931. Wrote Burgess,^  (12, pp. 285-86) 
"The power of the Reserve System to ... purchase ... government securities 
was limited by the collateral provisions for Federal Reserve notes, which 
left the Reserve Banks with little free gold not locked up behind Federal 
Reserve notes." The views of Woodlief Thomas (43), Assistant Director of 
the Board's Division of Research and Statistics, were in precise agreement 
with those of Burgess. Goldenweiser (20), Thomas' superior in the 
Division of Research and Statistics, agreed that the collateral require­
ments constituted a serious constraint, but his exposition of the problem 
differs in one important respect. He wrote; 
"If the System had purchased substantial amounts of government 
securities so as to ease the position of member banks, this 
would have made it possible for them to reduce their indebted­
ness to the Reserve Banks. Desirable as such a reduction of 
debt would have been in itself, it would have had the incidental 
and irrational result of diminishing available collateral for 
Federal Reserve notes. The Federal Reserve Banks would have 
had to use gold to replace the collateral and a shortage of gold 
available as reserves against Federal Reserve deposits would 
have developed. 
"It is probably true, as has been asserted by critics, that a 
full-fledged easing policy by the System at that time might 
have mitigated the disasters of subsequent years. But such a 
policy, on a sufficient scale to be significant, would have 
involved a suspension of reserve requirements against Federal 
Reserve deposits. This the authorities at that time were not 
mentally prepared to contemplate. 
"Whether an extremely bold and far reaching policy of easing at 
that time could have changed the course of events is debatable; 
that it could not have been put into effect is beyond dispute." 
(20, pp. 159-61) 
Never, within the pages of his book, does Goldenweiser refer to the 
free gold problem per se. The shortage which he most anticipated was in 
F^ormer Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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the reserve against deposits, rather "zhaiî in free gold. The two are 
closely related, but are distinguishable. On the likelihood of open 
market purchases resulting in a shortage of reserves against deposits, we 
shall have more to say in a later chapter.^  
Regardless of the fact that Goldenweiser and Burgess were writing 
after their associations with the Reserve System had terminated, one 
might suspect that their viewpoints on the free gold problem had been 
colored by those associations. However, a number of their contemporaries 
concur in the general conclusions of these former Federal Reserve offi­
cials . 
"It is undeniable that large open market purchases of securities 
before the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in February, 1932, would 
have put a strain on the gold reserves of the Federal Reserve System," 
Villard (50, p. 728) admits, "but it is not clear that it was impossible 
for the System to maintain its acceptance portfolio." Villard contends 
that a reduction in acceptance rates would have been desirable, althouj^ n 
he concedes that such a policy in itself would have been far from suffi­
cient to turn the monetary tide and that "there was little that the 
Reserve System could have done ... that would not have further reduced its 
margin of free gold." (50, p. 737) Paris (32) agrees that free gold 
constituted a problem, but his commitment to this view is rather vaguely 
expressed. To the present, numerous authorities on monetary history 
continue to emphasize the restraining role of free gold on monetary policy 
in late 1931. For example, Studenski and Kroos (42, p. 368) state that 
S^ee p. 86 , 
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collateral requirements "constituted a serious threat to continued expan­
sion of the currency." 
The most prolific writer on the free gold problem was Benjamin 
Anderson (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5), who from early 1930 issued constant warnings 
that free gold was insufficient to support a cheap money policy. Anderson 
also belonged to the school which opposed an aggressive open market program 
on general principles at this time. Relief to the strain on bank reserves 
should come through liquidation of bank credit, Anderson maintained. A 
general readjustment was needed, and artificially cheap money might lead 
to a temporary revival of business, but not to a general rectification of 
conditions. Furthermore, being a disciple of the "real-bills" doctrine, 
Anderson was disturbed by suggestion that collateral requirements be 
altered. "The law," he stated, 
"contemplates an elastic Federal Reserve note issue, automat­
ically adjusted to the needs of trade through being linked with 
the holdings of commercial paper by the Federal Reserve 
System .... But the law very properly refuses to allow Federal 
Reserve notes to be issued against Government securities pur­
chased by the Federal Reserve Banks, which have no relation to 
the needs of trade." (2, p. 4) 
Anderson's attitude toward collateral requirements was not unique with 
him. Most monetary traditionalists held similar beliefs. Writing several 
months before Britain suspended gold payments, Beckhart (8) mentioned that 
proposals for permitting the use of government securities as collateral 
had been put forth. He declared in utter amazement: 
"That anyone would seriously consider this proposal, the coinage 
of government obligations into currency, seems inconceivable. 
One of the primary purposes of the Federal Reserve Act was to do 
away with a government bond-secured note issue ...." (8, p. 149) 
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By the time the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, Anderson had moderated 
his views. He conceded that the bill was "justified as a temporary 
emergency measure .... We had already had a very heavy liquidation of 
credit in 1931 and early 1932. It was undesirable to liquidate further, 
if we could avoid it, and the Glass-Steagall Bill, enabling us to use our 
vast gold resources more freely and with less technical difficulty, was a 
useful and helpful emergency measure." (5, p. 11) In his financial 
history (1), published almost 20 years later, we find a further evolution 
in Anderson's thinking — there he laments the fact that the Federal 
Reserve Banks could not engage in open market purchases in the fall of 
1931. 
Harris (27, p. 380) agreed with Anderson's earlier position that the 
free gold of the System "was not large enough to allow the unrestricted 
purchase of securities" but that a tight money policy was in order during 
the disastrous autumn of 1931, regardless of the free gold position. 
Higher discount rates and stable holdings of governments would force banks 
to economize on their resources and to borrow no more than they absolutely 
needed — desirable results, in Harris' opinion. 
There were still others who opposed the use of open market operations 
in general. Whitney (51, p. 68) asserted that "the greatest obstacle to 
effective discount policy has been the excessive use of open market opera­
tions as separate instruments of control." Willis (52) considered open 
market operations as a kind of "forced feeding" which was unlikely to have 
much success. Hardy (24, p. 274) agreed that the supply of free gold had 
been seriously depleted and that "there was real danger that further with­
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drawals, especially on the part of France, might result in embarrassment 
for the Reserve Banks." However, there would have been no need for the 
Glass-Steagall Act had the System not encouraged the unfortunate tradition 
against borrowing, and had it been willing to retain lower discount rates 
in late 1931, Hardy maintained. He would have much preferred the stimu­
lation of credit through the use of the discount window to open market 
operations, which he claimed were never intended to be more than a supple­
mental device. 
A mere handful of those who wrote on economic policy during the 
depression decade contended that an aggressive purchase program could have 
been carried out in the fall of 1931. Writing just prior to the British 
departure from gold, Rogers (40, p. 208) complained that the Federal 
Reserve Banks had been acting as "gigantic sponges continually soaking up 
the ever inflowing golden flood." Monetary authorities, he warned, "must 
either use their great 'open market' powers to arrest damaging price 
declines, or else must face highly deserved criticism." Since this was 
written before the tremendous raid on U. S. gold commenced, it loses much 
of its force, however. Hawtrey (28, pp. 241-42) believed that the System 
could have bought governments in much greater volume, even during the 
months immediately preceding the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
However, Hawtrey apparently misinterpreted the gold requirements to which 
the Reserve Banks were subject, for he mistakenly asserted that government 
securities could be held against deposits in Reserve Banks and that the 
acquisition of more governments would release gold unless note circulation 
consequently increased. Among latter-day historians who have accepted the 
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Friedman-Schwartz argument are Robertson (38) and Horvitz (30, p. 396), 
who acknowledge that these authors "present convincing evidence that the 
gold reserve argument was only a rationalization and not a real reason for 
Federal Reserve failure to adopt a vigorous easy money policy." 
With few exceptions, those who were familiar with the determinants of 
free gold in the 1930's, and who wrote on the subject, accepted it as a 
matter of course that extensive open market operations between September, 
1931, and February, 1932, would have had disastrous repercussions on the 
System's free gold position. This opinion was held by those who had faith 
in the efficacy of such operations in general as a means of controlling 
economic fluctuations, as well as by those who regarded this powerful new 
tool as one which would have been best left undiscovered. 
Outline of the Study 
The primary object of the chapters which follow is to determine 
whether the barrier which depression era economists believed the free gold 
shortage created for a vigorous open market policy was real or illusory. 
More specifically, we will investigate the Friedman-Schwartz contentions 
that a $1 billion purchase could have been undertaken in late 1931 without 
endangering the free gold position, and that an operation of this size 
would have been sufficient to stabilize the money stock. 
In Chapter II free gold is defined in a more rigorous way, both 
verbally and symbolically, and a set of assumptions regarding some of the 
determinants of that quantity is put forth. Chapter III presents a simple 
model of bank portfolio behavior which will subsequently be utilized in 
predicting, under the assumption of a $1 billion open market purchase, 
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hypothetical values of member bank borrowings, acceptance holdings, and 
loans — the first two variables being important determinants of free 
gold, while the third has a great influence on the money stock. The 
results of empirical tests of the model for the period 1930 to 1935 are 
provided in Chapter IV. Chapter V contains the most important findings of 
this study. In this chapter we present our conclusions, and the methods 
used to obtain them, as to the effect of a $1 billion purchase of govern­
ments on free gold and on the money supply. In addition, we investigate 
the extent to which the System could have pursued the other alternatives 
for easing the free gold position which Friedman and Schwartz claim were 
available. Finally, a brief discussion of the more qualitative reasons 
which led Friedman and Schwartz to their conclusion that free gold exerted 
no "major influence on Federal Reserve policy" (18, p. 401) is given. The 
final chapter presents a summary of our investigation and some concluding 
observations. 
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CHAPTER II. THE DETERMINANTS OF FREE GOLD 
In Chapter I, we discussed free gold and the factors affecting it in 
a very general way. This chapter will describe the determinants of this 
much-debated concept more thoroughly, and will develop the equations to 
be used in predicting the hypothetical effect on free gold should the 
monetary authorities have embarked on an open-market purchase program in 
late 1931. Specific assumptions as to the effect of security purchases 
on some of the determinants of free gold are outlined. Finally, we 
analyze the implications for free gold of the particular assumptions made 
by Friedman and Schwartz. 
The term "free gold" meant gold and gold certificates held by the 
Federal Reserve Banks that was not required either as reserves or as 
collateral for Federal Reserve notes. Free gold was calculated by 
deducting from Reserve Bank gold reserves the gold necessary to meet the 
following requirements : 
1. A 21 percent reserve in gold or lawful money against deposits. All 
deposit liabilities of Federal Reserve Banks -- member bank, govern­
ment, foreign bank, and other — were subject to the reserve require­
ment. Lawful money, which could be used in satisfying the requirement, 
consisted of standard silver dollars, silver certificates and legal 
tender notes. 
2. A W percent gold reserve against Federal Reserve notes. Federal 
Reserve notes subject to this requirement included all notes issued 
to the Reserve Banks by the Federal Reserve Agent, except those notes 
held in the vaults of the issuing banks. Therefore, reserves were 
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required against notes held by Reserve Banks other than the bank of 
issue and by the Treasury, as well as against notes held by the 
public. 
3. 100 percent collateral in gold or eligible paper against Federal 
Reserve notes issued to the Reserve Banks by the Federal Reserve 
Agent. Note that this requirement applied to all notes issued to the 
Reserve Banks, including those held as till money in the issuing 
Banks. Eligible paper consisted of discounts and acceptances pur­
chased in the open market. It was this collateral requirement which 
was altered by the Glass-Steagall Act of February, 1932. Under its 
provisions, the Reserve Banks were authorized to include government 
securities as collateral against Federal Reserve notes. 
Gold pledged as collateral also constituted a part of the 
Reserve Bank reserves, but could be counted as reserves only against 
Federal Reserve notes and not against deposits. Hence, the gold 
pledged to satisfy collateral requirements served at the same time to 
satisfy Requirement 2. In fact, because gold required as collateral 
was always considerably greater than the 40 percent required against 
notes, the latter requirement did not enter separately into the 
calculation of free gold. 
4. A gold redemption fund in the U. S. Treasury equal to at least 
 ^percent of notes not covered by gold collateral. The volume of 
notes not covered by gold was considered to be the amount of eligible 
paper pledged. This was not equal to total collateral required less 
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gold pledged, because the Reserve Banks always pledged somewhat more 
1 
collateral than was absolutely necessary to meet the requirement. 
Symbolic Definition of Free Gold 
Free gold as defined in the preceding paragraphs can be written sym­
bolically as: 
(2.1) Gp = Rp - - .35D^  - .05Ep 
where : 
Gp = free gold 
Rp = total reservesgof Reserve Banks = gold and gold certificates 
+ lawful money 
Gg = gold required as collateral against Federal Reserve notes 
= total deposit liabilities of Federal Reserve Banks 
.35D^  = reserves required against deposits 
Ep = eligible paper pledged as collateral against Federal Reserve 
notes 
.05Ep = gold required for the redemption fund with the U. S. 
Treasury 
We can further specify that: 
(2.2) G^  = N; - Ep 
E^xcellent discussions of the free gold concept are provided in 
System publications such as (48, 1932, p. 16-18) and (49, 1932, pp. 143-44). 
2 If lawful money were larger than reserves required against deposits 
this formulation would overstage free gold since it would imply that the 
excess lawful money could be used to satisfy other requirements. Lawful 
money was, for the period we are considering, so small that this situation 
never arose. 
22 
where ; 
Nj = volume of Federal Reserve notes Issued by the Federal 
Reserve Agent to the Reserve Banks.^  
In discussions of Federal Reserve policy, one widely used identity is 
that member bank reserves equal sources of reserve funds minus competing 
uses of reserve funds. This identity can be written as: 
(2.3) = BP + AP + G„ + OR + MG + TC - C - T - OA - D„ - D„ 
where : 
S G N 
D,, = member bank deposits with Federal Reserve Banks = member 
M , , bank reserves 
Bp = bills discounted and advances made by Reserve Banks 
Ap = bills (bankers' and trade acceptances, and acceptances 
payable in foreign currencies) bought by Reserve Banks 
Gg = government securities held by Reserve Banks 
OR = other Reserve Bank credit 
MG = monetary gold stock 
TC = Treasury currency 
It can be shown that there is nothing to be gained by including 
reserves required against notes as a separate component in the free gold 
equation. Let: 
G^  = reserves required against notes = 40 percent of notes 
outside issuing Reserve Banks 
Gg = gold collateral needed in addition to the reserve against 
1 notes 
Then: 
" ' S " Bp. 
Gc = + (HI - - Ej.) - N, - Ep. 
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C = currency in circulation 
T = Treasury cash 
OA = other Federal Reserve accounts 
Dg = Treasury deposits with Federal Reserve Banks 
= non-member bank deposits with Federal Reserve Banks 
The sum of the items with positive signs equals total sources of member 
bank reserves, while the sum of the negatively-signed elements equals 
total competing uses of these funds. 
Total deposit liabilities of Federal Reserve Banks, D^ , is defined as 
Dg + + D^ . Using this equality, and rearranging terms in Equation 2.3, 
we obtain: 
(2.4) Dj - Dç + + Dy = Bp + Aj, + Gg + MG + 0 - C 
where : 
0 = OR + TC - T - OA 
Reserves required against deposits can now be expressed as: 
(2.5) .35D^  = .35(Bp + A^  + Gg + MG + 0 - C) 
Two additional definitions which will be used are; 
(2.6) C = Cp + Cq 
where : 
Cp = Federal Reserve notes in circulation 
CQ = other currency in circulation 
and (2.7) 
where : 
= Federal Reserve notes issued to Federal Reserve Banks but 
not in circulation, i.e., notes held by Reserve Banks and 
by the U. S. Treasury 
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Substituting Equations 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 into 2.1 yields: 
(2.8) Gp = Rp - (Cp + - Ep) - .35(Bp + A^ , + Gg + MG + 0 - - C^ ) -
.05 Ep 
= Rf - .65 Cp - + .95 Ep - .35(Bp + Ap + GS + MG + 0 - C^ ) 
Assumptions Regarding the Free Gold Variables 
and Their Implications 
It is our aim to predict the change in free gold which would have 
obtained had a $1 billion open market campaign been undertaken in late 
1931. In this section assumptions as to the determinants of some of the 
variables in the free gold equation are specified and from these, more 
specific equations for predicting the alteration in the free gold position 
are derived. These equations have some rather interesting implications 
for the level of free gold which are discussed at the conclusion of this 
section. 
Taking the first difference of Equation 2.8, a change in the value of 
free gold is defined as: 
(2.9) AGp = - .65 ACp - + .95 - .35(z^ p + AAp+AGg+Z^ G + 
AP - ACq) 
An increase in any one of the positively signed items will, ceteris 
paribus, improve the free gold position, while the enlargement of an ele­
ment with a negative sign will contribute to a reduction in free gold. 
The value of Gg, government security holdings of the Reserve Banks, 
is determined by the monetary authorities. Other things equal, a purchase 
of the size suggested by Friedman and Schwartz would have reduced free 
gold by $350 million. The ceteris paribus assumption is not too unrealis­
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tic when applied to R^ , MG and 0. It is improbable that the gold stock, 
MG, would have been greatly affected by Federal Reserve open market pur­
chases in late 1931. Such purchases would have had little effect on the 
already abnormally low short-term interest rates, and therefore on inter­
national capital flows. Any rise in income and prices produced by the easy 
money policy might have contributed to an expansion of imports relative to 
exports, and hence to an acceleration of the gold outflow, but since inter­
national trade had all but disintegrated by this time, such effects were 
likely to be minor. The primary determinant of gold outflows in late 
1931 was undoubtedly the fear generated by the collapse of the gold 
standard in Britain. Unless foreign creditors would have viewed an 
aggressive monetary policy in this country as an additional threat to the 
maintenance of the gold standard, such a policy should not have contrib­
uted to their panicky demands for gold. Hence, we will postulate that the 
augmentation of Reserve Bank security holdings would have produced no 
significant change in the monetary gold stock. In a later chapter we 
consider the implications of relaxing this assumption. 
The gold reserves of the Reserve Banks, which comprised more than 
90 percent of their total reserves, R^ , were highly correlated with 
changes in the gold stock — in fact, the Reserve Banks held the vast 
majority of U. S. gold. Therefore, we maintain that R^ , as well as MG, 
would have suffered no serious deterioration from a $1 billion purchase. 
The quantity designated by 0 exhibited very little change over the 
entire period from 1928 to 1932. Since this element is a conglomerate 
derived from the values of Other Federal Reserve Accounts, Other Federal 
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Reserve Credit (mainly float). Treasury Cash and Treasury Currency, it 
is necessarily affected by a multitude of factors. The most logical 
procedure is to assume that 0 is another variable which is unaffected by 
Federal Reserve open market operations. 
Most of the Federal Reserve notes issued but not in circulation, 
C , were held in the vaults of the issuing Reserve Banks. Harris 
(27, p. 770) discusses the factors which governed the volume of such 
counter cash: 
"In periods when reserve officials are concerned with the 
problem of the adequacy of free gold, they are inclined to 
economize on their tills and thus release gold, as an exami­
nation of the movements in 1931-32 will reveal. On the other 
hand, the extent of the fluctuations in the demand for currency 
is necessarily an important factor in the determination of the 
notes held in tills by reserve banks." 
The level of till money was, then, a function of expected currency demand 
and of the free gold position. Bankers, including central bankers, 
frequently operate according to certain rules-of-thumb. A logical rule 
for the Reserve Banks to have followed in this case would have been to 
maintain the ratio of vault cash to Federal Reserve notes at or above 
some minimum level — this ratio being determined at each point in time 
on the basis of expected currency flows. Whether or not the ratio fell to 
its minimum value would depend on the strains on free gold. The lowest 
point to which the ratio of C„ to C„ fell during the years 1928 to 1932 
was 10 percent in January, 1932. 
Because the System claimed to be doing everything possible to relieve 
the free gold problem at this time, one would expect that C^ /Cp was 
approaching its minimum acceptable value. Therefore, as one alternative 
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in predicting the hypothetical value of free gold for late 1931, a 
10 percent floor on this ratio will be assumed.^ However, in view of a \ 
Federal Reserve Board statement in its Annual Report for 1932, this may 
be assuming too high a value. In discussing the situation on February 24, 
1932, the Board explains that free gold could have been 
" ... increased somewhat by reducing the volume of Federal 
Reserve notes held by the Federal Reserve banks in their own 
vaults, but even after that volume was reduced to the minimum 
required as an operating matter, the free gold would have been 
$542,000,000." (48, 1932, p. 18) 
Since free gold was $416 million on February 24, the Board is implying 
that free gold could have been increased by $126 million through the 
return of notes to the Federal Reserve Agent. Because there was a 1 to 1 
relationship between free gold and Federal Reserve notes held in the 
vaults of Reserve Banks, this in turn implies a reduction of $126 million 
in such holdings. The ratio of C to C„ would have consequently declined 
to approximately 6 percent. Of course, since seasonal currency demands 
would have been lower in February than during the fall and winter, the 
minimum ratio considered essential was probably correspondingly lower on 
the February date. However, it does seem of interest to predict the change 
in free gold under each of these possibilities for :Cj^=.IC^, and C^=.06Cp. 
The amount of eligible paper pledged, Ep, was always less than the 
amount of such paper held by the Reserve Banks. The reason for this was 
apparently to minimize time-consuming bookkeeping adjustments. Federal 
Reserve Banks purchased only "seasoned bills," i.e., those which had been 
^The actual ratio was 12 percent at the end of 1931. 
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in the market for some time and were approaching maturity. At the end of 
1931, for example, the maturity of almost 80 percent of the eligible 
paper held by the Reserve Banks was less than 15 days (48, p. 71). Had 
all eligible paper held been pledged, it would obviously have necessitated 
quite frequent withdrawals and deposits of collateral simply to eliminate 
matured bills from the Reserve Agent's collateral holdings. Over the 
period January, 1928, to June, 1932, the largest ratio of eligible paper 
pledged to eligible paper held was .986 in May, 1930, when eligible paper 
maturing within 15 days comprised only 60 percent of paper held. The 
mean ratio over the interval was approximately .95, which was also its 
value for the fourth quarter of 1931. This is the ratio which will be 
used in predicting the effect on free gold of the hypothetical security 
purchase. 
The estimate of the effect on currency in circulation due to the 
hypothetical security purchase to be used throughout this paper is that 
value implied by the assumptions of Friedman and Schwartz. Equation 2.10 
is reported by the authors (18, p. 791) to be "the basic equation that we 
have used in most of our analysis of the factors affecting the money 
stock": 
M = money stock 
H = high-powered money 
D = deposits of commercial banks 
R = bank reserves 
C = currency held by the public 
(2.10) [D/R(1+D/C)"] |p/R + D/C J 
where: 
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In order to determine C, we need hypothetical values of M, H, D/R and 
D/C. These are provided by Friedman and Schwartz. Had discounts and 
bills bought remained constant between August, 1931, and January, 1932, 
"a purchase of $1 billion of government securities would have meant a rise 
in high-powered money by $650 million more than the actual rise." 
(18, p. 399) Since the actual value of H in January, 1932, was $7.704 
billion, the hypothetical value becomes $8.354 billion. Furthermore, 
assuming that the actual deposit-reserve ratio of 11.28 in January, 1932, 
was unchanged by the open market purchase, an improvement in the deposit-
currency ratio to 7.10 "would, under these hypothetical circumstances, 
have enabled the stock of money to be stable instead of falling by 12 
percent." (18, p. 399) Substituting these values for H, D/R and D/C into 
Equation 2.10 yields: 
(2.11) M = $8.354 billion ^^ii^28^+^7!io°^ = $41.525 billion 
We are given (18, p. 791) that: 
(2.12) H = C + R 
(2.13) M = C + D 
Therefore, we can write: 
(2.14) D/R.f^ = k 
(2.15) M - C = k (H - C) 
(2.16) M - kH = (1 - k) C 
and finally: 
n p _ M - kH _ M - D/R (H) 
(2.17) C - ^  ^ - 1 _ D/R 
Inserting Friedman's assumed values for D/R, M,and H into 
2.17, we find that: 
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(2.18) C = ^41.525 billion - (U 28) (98.354 billion) . 
JL ** D. JL • ^  W 
Friedman's estimates of currency in circulation are seasonally 
adjusted, \irtiereas the components of free gold in Equation 11 are not. 
However, we would not expect the use of seasonally adjusted data to have 
much effect on the hypothetical change in C as a result of the open market 
purchase. The difference between the hypothetical and the actual values 
of C for January, 1932, can be considered as the effect on C of the pur­
chase program. This difference is $231 million. Since the bank portfolio 
data needed for predicting borrowings and acceptances (two crucial compo­
nents of free gold) is available for December 31, 1931, but not for Janu­
ary, 1932, our predictions will apply to a hypothetical $1 billion purchase 
completed by the end of 1931 rather than a month later, as Friedman and 
Schwartz assume. However, we will postulate that the effect on currency 
in circulation would have been the same regardless of whether the program 
were terminated in December or January. This assumption implies that had 
Reserve Bank security holdings risen between August and December, 1931, 
by $1 billion, currency in circulation would consequently have expanded by 
$231 million. 
The equation for free gold contains the components of currency in 
circulation, C and C_, rather than C alone. It seems unlikely that the R (J 
proportional relationship between Federal Reserve notes and other forms of 
currency held by the public would be greatly disturbed by a large open 
market purchase. Therefore, it is assumed that this ratio is exogenously 
determined. At the close of 1931, comprised 49 percent of total cur­
rency in circulation. 
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The assumptions made regarding the changes in R^, MG, 0, C^, C^, Ep 
and CQ which would have resulted from à late 1931 open market operation of 
$1 billion dollars are summarized in Equations 2.19 through 2.25b. 
(2.19) ^ = 0 
(2.20) = 0 
(2.21) AO = 0 
(2.22) = .49($231 million) = $113.19 million 
R 
(2.23) ACq  = .51($231 million) = $117.81 million 
(2.24) = .95 ZSLJJ = .95(AP + M) 
where E^ = eligible paper held by Federal Reserve Banks = + A^, 
(2.25a) AC„ = .1($2,716 million^) - $323 million = -$51 million 
(2.25b) = .06($2,716 million) - $323 million = -$160 million 
Substituting Equations 2.19 through 2.25a into Equation 2.9, we obtain 
the following expression for the hypothetical change in free gold: 
(2.26) AGp = -.65($113.19 million) - (-$51 million) + .95 [.95(^5?^ + 
a 
Mp)] -.35(^Pp + ^  + $1,000 million - $117.81 
million) 
= -$331.34 million + .5525 (/^^ + A^) 
If we replace 2.25a with 2.25b, which implies greater economizing on 
till money at Reserve Banks, the predicted change in free gold becomes: 
(2.27) AG„ = -.65($113.19 million) - (-$160 million) + .95 [.95 
^B 
(Z^p + AAp)] -.35(^p + AAp + $1,000 million - $117.81 
^The value of on December 31, 1931 was $2,603 million. Hence, the 
hypothetical value of becomes $2,716 million. 
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million) 
= -$222.34 million + .5525(Z^p + Mp) 
These results are very interesting in themselves. The value of free 
gold at the end of 1911 was approximately $600 million. There are no 
official published figures on free gold, but the chart from which Chart 1 
was taken appeared in the Board's Annual Report for 1932 (48, 1932, p. 17) 
Even with no change in borrowings or Federal Reserve acceptance holdings, 
our estimates are that free gold would have declined to a point between 
approximately $375 million and $270 million as the result of the open 
market purchase. The lowest point to which free gold dipped during the 
months immediately preceding the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act was 
approximately $400 million in February, 1932, and this was the least it 
had been for 10 years. Hence, even if the purchase did not adversely 
affect discounting and bills bought by the System, free gold would have 
declined to an abnormally low level. 
The Implications for Free Gold 
of the Friedman-Schwartz Assumptions 
Friedman and Schwartz (18, p. 399) explicitly assume that their 
hypothetical purchase would have reduced the actual level of borrowings 
in January, 1932, by $560 million and would have resulted in an increase 
in System holdings of acceptances on that date of $210 million. Hence, 
the volume of eligible paper in the possession of the Reserve Banks would 
have been depleted by $350 million, and would have settled at its August, 
1931, level. Furthermore, by January, the date to which the Friedman-
Schwartz calculations apply, the actual volume of Federal Reserve notes in 
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circulation had climbed above its December value, while at the same time a 
substantial reduction — from $323 million to $275 million — in Reserve 
Bank counter cash had been made. The possibility of further economizing 
on tills was therefore much less in January than in December. If we add 
to the actual volume of Reserve notes in circulation, the expected change 
of $231 million due to the purchase program, Federal Reserve notes in 
circulation^ rise to $2,762 million. The change in C„ would have been a 
K 
positive $1 million under an assumption of = .IC^, or a negative $110 
million if C could have been reduced to a mere 6 percent of Reserve notes 
in circulation. Using these estimates, the change in free gold implied by 
the Friedman-Schwartz assumptions becomes, under the two alternatives for 
C„, that given in 2.28 and 2.29. 
(2.28) = -.65($114 million) - ($1 million) + .5525(-$350 million) 
a,F 
-.35($883 million)^ 
= -$577.53 million 
(2.29) AG^ = -.65($114 million) - (-$110 million) + .5525 ($350 
million) 
-.35($883 million) 
= -$466.53 million 
Free gold at the end of January, 1932, was approximately $450 million. 
Therefore, a decline of the magnitude shown in Equation 2.28 would have 
^Outside the U. S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks, 
2 Cpyg was slightly greater in January, 1932, than it had been in 
December, 1931. Hence, the values for and in Equations 2.28 and 
2.29 differ a bit from their counterparts in 2.26 and 2.27. 
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resulted in a negative value for free gold. Even with the greater economy 
of till money assumed in 2.29, free gold would have been completely elim­
inated. 
It is almost inconceivable that, given their assumptions as to the 
changes in and C, Friedman and Schwartz could have predicted any 
lesser change in free gold. Certainly the variables held constant, R^, 
MG and 0, would not have risen in response to the purchase — in fact, R 
and MG, as noted above, might have declined. There is little reason to 
expect any alteration in the relationship of to v^ich would have 
favorably affected free gold. Even if the proportion of eligible paper 
holdings pledged as collateral could have been increased by 1 or 2 percent, 
this would have augmented free gold by only a few million dollars. Hence, 
Friedman and Schwartz appear to be in the peculiar position of maintaining 
that a zero or negative level of free gold was sufficient in January, 1932. 
Our primary object is not, however, the discovery of the implied 
value of free gold under the Friedman-Schwartz assumptions, but rather to 
predict the consequences for free gold and the money stock of the policy 
which they suggest. To achieve this end we need estimates of and 
for Equations 2.26 and 2.27. We cannot simply accept the assumed values 
presented by Friedman and Schwartz, for they provide no explanation of 
the method used to derive these values. Furthermore, we must develop some 
estimate of the change in the deposit component of the money supply, 
having accepted the currency rise postulated by Friedman and Schwartz. 
The task of developing a theoretical framework which can aid in the 
explanation of ^  and as well as the change in bank loans, lAich 
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is a crucial determinant of bank deposits, is undertaken in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER III. A SIMPLE MODEL OF BANK PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop at the microeconomic level 
a model of bank portfolio behavior which can be used to explain borrowings 
f^oin Reserve Banks, acceptance holdings and loans granted by commercial 
banks during the early 1930's. 
We assume that the banker makes decisions at time t lAose objective 
is to maximize expected profits between t and t+1. However, he operates 
under certain constraints. The bank must maintain sufficient primary and 
secondary reserves to meet expected seasonal and other regular demands 
on its resources from depositors and from borrowers. This requirement 
will be termed the liquidity constraint. Secondly, the bank must be in a 
position to withstand any conceivable strain that may be placed upon it, 
such as the withdrawal of deposits occasioned by the unexpected departure 
of a large commercial customer, and still remain in business. We will 
define this necessity as the soundness constraint. Finally, any decision 
the banker makes must conform to the accounting identity that assets 
minus liabilities equal capital funds. 
Expected Profits 
In general, expected profits are increased by holding assets such as 
government securities, loans, short-term paper and long-term bonds. 
Borrowing from the Reserve Banks reduces expected profit. The expected 
profit equation can be written as: 
(3.1) E [TT] = E[r^] A + E[r^^] Ug + E[rg] S + E[r^ ] + E[r^ ] + 
M + E[rg] R + E [r^] U + E[rp] P + E[r^] L + 
ECrg] B 
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where: 
E[TT] = expected profits between t and t+1 
A = value of bankers' acceptances held at t 
Ug = value of U. S. Treasury bills held at t 
S = value of loans to brokers and dealers at t 
Ug = value of U. S. Treasury bonds held at t 
Ujj = value of U. S. Treasury notes held at t 
M = value of municipal bonds held at t 
R = value of railroad bonds held at t 
P = value of commercial paper (four to six months) held at t 
L = value of loans to customers held at t 
B = borrowings from Reserve Banks held at t 
E [r ], E [r ],..,E[r ] = expected rate of return on each 
A UB A 
variable. A, ,B, respectively 
For simplicity, we assume that the only income-generating assets 
which the banker can hold are those specified in the expected profit 
function. Borrowing creates a cost, and consequently its rate of return 
is always negative. The only variable costs incurred by the banker are 
assumed to be those associated with borrowing at the Federal Reserve 
discount window. 
No asset purchased by the banker at t matures prior to t+1 in this 
model. In empirical tests, a time horizon of three months is adopted. 
Although a shorter horizon might seem more realistic, this length was 
selected because data on bank portfolios for the 1930's is available only 
on a quarterly basis. 
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For assets idiich mature at t+1, the expected rate of return is known 
with certainty, and is simply one-fourth of the annual rate of interest; 
which they bear. Of the assets included in the model, bankers' accept­
ances, Treasury bills, loans to brokers and dealers and to customers are 
placed in this category. We are assuming, in effect, that any of these 
assets selected for the bank's portfolio at t matures in precisely 90 days. 
This assumption may not be entirely realistic, but given the paucity of 
bank portfolio data for the depression period, it seems to be unavoidable. 
The expected rate of return on borrowings is also a known, and is equal to 
one-fourth the discount rate preceded by a minus sign. 
Other assets in the model are treated as having a maturity greater 
than the time horizon. It is assumed that the banker's concept of income 
includes unrealized capital gains. Therefore, the expected rate of return 
on these investments must include the expected capital gain or loss in 
percentage terms, as well as the known rate of interest for the period. 
The banker chooses at t the combination of variables in Equation 3.1 
which will maximize his expected profits over the interval t to t+1, 
subject to liquidity, soundness and balance sheet constraints. This does 
not, however, imply that during the period t to t+1, he is locked into the 
particular portfolio vAiich was chosen at t. With the passage of each 
moment of time, the banker revises his expectations and decides on a new 
portfolio based on his expected profits for a new time horizon of t to 
t+1. 
The Liquidity Constraint 
Bank liquidity is most frequently measured in terms of certain 
balance-sheet ratios, such as the ratio of loans to deposits or of 
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short-term assets to deposits. The former is a less satisfactory measure 
than the latter. The ratio of loans to deposits is intended to demon­
strate the degree to which the bank has already used up its available 
resources to accommodate the credit needs of its customers. A low ratio 
supposedly indicates a high degree of liquidity. However, this standard 
would overestimate the liquidity position of a bank with an unusually 
large long-term bond portfolio. The ratio of short-term assets to deposits 
provides a better indication of the volume of bank assets which are easily 
convertible into funds with which to meet deposit withdrawals or to make 
additional loans. 
It will be assumed that the banker measures his liquidity in terms 
of the short-term asset to deposit ratio, and that he maximizes expected 
profit subject to a constraint that this ratio attains some specified 
minimum level. If the banker operates under a time horizon of t to t+1, 
he will decide on an acceptable level of liquidity at t based on his 
expectations of loan demand and deposit withdrawals over this interval. 
Therefore, the liquidity constraint should take into account the banker's 
expectations. Since these are unknown, and would be particularly diffi­
cult to estimate for so volatile a period, it will be assumed that the 
minimum level of liquidity acceptable to the banker at a given point in 
time was the ratio actually obtained. 
Numerous forms of the short-term asset deposit ratio, each with 
slight variations in the types of assets and deposits included, could be 
developed. The most reasonable form for our purposes seems to be the 
following: 
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E + V + A  +  S + U g + P - B  
TD + DD„ - RR 
N 
where : 
E = excess reserves with Federal Reserve Banks 
V = vault cash 
TO = time deposits 
DD^ = net demand deposits 
RR = reserves required against demand and time deposits 
The numerator of 3.2 is composed of high-quality assets maturing within 
one year, less borrowings. It is therefore a measure of net liquid 
assets available for meeting potential needs. The quantity expressed by 
the denominator is the maximum reserve deficiency which the bank could 
face, i.e., the deficiency that would result should all deposits be with­
drawn. 
Let: 
(3.3) V = 1 - reserve ratio against demand deposits 
and : 
(3.4) s = 1 - required reserve ratio against time deposits 
Substituting 3.3 and 3.4 into Equation 3.2, we obtain: 
E + V + A  +  S + U „ + p - B  
(3.5) ® 
DD^ - (1-v) DD^ + TD - (1-s) TD 
Demand deposits can be separated into two components: deposits created by 
loans, and other deposits. Define: 
(3.6) DD^ = DP + 
where : 
DP = DD^ - D^ 
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and: 
= deposits created in the process of granting loans = L 
Equating the liability, deposits created by granting loans,with the asset 
loans, amounts to assuming that when a loan is granted the customer always 
receives a credit to his demand deposit account rather than currency or 
an addition to time deposits. This is probably not a radical distortion 
of reality, however. 
Substituting 3.6 into 3.5 and writing the result in the form of a 
constraint which must meet a certain minimum level, a, yields: 
E + V + A  +  S + U g + P - B  
(3.7) v(D„ + ) + sTD ^ 
In estimating the model. Dp, TD, E and V will be considered as 
exogenously determined. These quantities cannot be altered by decisions 
of the banker at t. The decision as to the proportion of assets to hold 
in the highly liquid forms of excess reserves and vault cash is treated 
as one made separately from the allocation of the portfolio of income-
earning assets. This is analogous to the procedure frequently employed in 
consumption theory which treats the consumer's choice of a bundle of goods 
to be consumed as independent from the decision of what proportion of 
income will be saved. 
Deposits other than those created by the banker in the process of 
making loans are the result either of decisions by the non-bank public as 
to the division of its money stock between deposits and currency, or of 
bank acquisitions of earning assets other than loans. Total bank deposits 
will rise as the result of bank purchases of securities as the funds 
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received by the seller are placed in time or demand deposits. Generally, 
however, the bank making the investment could not expect that his bank 
would be the recipient of the proceeds. He would therefore logically 
assume that variations in his security holdings are uncorrelated with 
changes in his time and demand deposit liabilities. If the banker also 
operates under perfectly competitive conditions, it is unlikely that 
he will be able to alter his policies so as to attract a greater proportion 
of the deposit business or to influence the total volume of deposits held 
by the public. The individual banker would therefore be expected to view 
Dp and TD as exogenously determined variables. They are unaffected by any 
action he may take. 
Transferring constants to the right-hand side of 3.7 results in: 
(3.8) A + S+Ug+P-B-cvvDj^Sor [vDp + sTD] - E - V 
Equation 3.8 is the form of the liquidity constraint which will be esti­
mated. 
The Soundness Constraint 
The soundness of a bank is generally considered as synonymous with 
capital adequacy. As expressed by one author, bank capital funds are: 
" ... a factor, perhaps the most important factor, in main­
taining the confidence a bank must enjoy to continue in busi­
ness and prosper. The essential function of bank capital, in 
other words, is to keep the bank open and operating so that 
time and earnings can absorb losses; to inspire sufficient 
confidence in the bank on the part of depositors and the 
supervisor so that it will not be faced with costly liqui­
dation." (13, p. 158) 
One widely accepted measure of capital adequacy is the ratio of total 
capital accounts to risk-assets, called the risk-asset or risk ratio. In 
its simplest form, the denominator of the ratio includes all assets except 
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U. S. government securities, cash, and bank balances. The deduction of 
completely liquid assets such as cash and bank balances, and of government 
securities, recognizes the essentially riskless character of these assets. 
Of course, the risks inherent in other assets held by the bank are not 
uniform, and recently numerous risk-asset formulas have been developed 
which take into consideration the differences in degree of risk among bank 
assets. Lacking the data necessary to employ one of these more complex 
forms of analysis, however, we will have to be content with the simpler 
risk-asset ratio. 
The risk ratio was first employed by the Federal government in 
analyzing capital adequacy during the late 1940's. At that time, it was a 
relatively new addition to banking terminology. The banker of the 1930*s, 
however, could scarcely have avoided attaching great importance to solven­
cy. It seems reasonable to assume that even if he did not overtly employ 
a risk-asset ratio in determining his degree of soundness, the banker 
acted ^  he were constrained by a desire for a certain minimum ratio 
of capital to risk assets. 
This constraint can be written as; 
(3.9) KT (A + U^+S+U^+U„+M + R + U+ P+D^ + V + R. + B„ + JJ (J IN L L D 
CIPC + 0^ - V - - BG - CIPC - UG - UG - U^) 
=  K T  ( A  +  S +  M  +  R +  U +  P + D ^  +  O J ^ ) S P  
where : 
K = capital funds 
Rg = reserves with Federal Reserve Banks 
45 
B„ = balances with other banks 
i5 
CIPC = cash items in the process of collection 
0^ = other assets 
P = minimum acceptable risk-asset ratio 
It is assumed that K and 0^ at any point of time are given. Consid­
ering K to be a constant amounts to forcing the banker to make necessary 
adjustments in the risk ratio by adjusting his asset portfolio rather than 
by issuing additional capital stock. According to Robinson, the former 
procedure is generally recommended for sound bank management (39, p. 436). 
Because the uncertainties of the 1930's make prediction of g an 
extremely difficult problem, the same assumption will be employed as for 
o; -- that the minimum acceptable level Was that actually attained. 
Collecting all constant terms in 3.9 on the right-hand side of the 
equation, the soundness constraint can be written as: 
(3.10) A + S + M + R + U + P + ^ K/p -
The Accounting Identity 
The banker operates subject to one more constraint — the value of 
his assets must equal the value of his liabilities plus capital accounts. 
We write this constraint as: 
(3.11) E + RR + A + n + S + U., + U.. + M + R + U + P + L - B - DD„ -J5 G iN iM 
TD + Og = 0 
where: 
Og = other assets - other liabilities - capital 
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It has been determined that: 
(3.12) RR = (1-v) + (1-v) Dp + (1-s) TD 
(3.13) L = 
(3.14) Dp = DD^ - D^ 
Substitution of Equations 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 into 3.11 yields: 
(3.15) E + (1-v) D^ + (1-v) Dp + (1-s) TD + A + Ug + S + Ug + + M + 
R  +  U +  P + D J ^ - B - D ^ - D P - T D  +  0 2  =  
E + (1-v) D^ - vDP - sTD + A + Ug + S + + M + R + U + 
P - B + O2 = 0 
Variables which are considered to be exogenously determined are E, 
Dp,TD and O^. Moving these terms to the right side of Equation 3.15 we 
have: 
(3.16) (1-v) Dj^+A + Ug+S+Ug+Ujj+M+R + U+ P- B= vDp + 
sTD - Og - E 
The model to be estimated now consists of four equations: 
(3.1) E [TT] = E [r ] A + E [r J U + E [r ] S + E [r ] U + E [r j 
A G N 
+ E M + E [r^j R + E [r^J U + E [ip] P + E [r^] L + 
E [FG] B 
(3.8) A + S+UG+P-B-A VD^ ?- a [vDp + STD] - E - V 
(3.10) A + S+ M + R+ U + P+D^ < K/P - 0^ 
and : 
(3.16) (1-v) D^+A+Up + S+Ug+U^+M + R+ U+ P- B= vDp + 
sTD - Og - E 
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The banker maximizes Equation 3.1, the expected profit function, 
subject to 3.8, 3.10 and 3.16, the liquidity, soundness and balance sheet 
constraints, respectively. In the next section, we describe the technique 
used for testing this model, and the empirical results obtained when it was 
used to explain the portfolio behavior of member banks during the early 
1930's. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE MODEL 
This chapter presents empirical findings with regard to the explanatory 
ability of the model described in Chapter 3 \irtien applied to bank portfolio 
data for the early depression years. In the first section, we discuss 
certain aggregation problems which arise because these data are not 
available on a strictly microeconomic level. Next, the data used in 
testing are described. The final section outlines the particular testing 
technique employed, statistical results and estimates of the model's 
goodness-of-fit. 
Aggregation Problems 
This theory of bank behavior is specified at a microeconomic level. 
Hence, to test it properly would require the use of data for individual 
banks. Unfortunately, such data are not available. The least aggregative 
data available are for four classes of member banks: Central Reserve City 
banks in New York City and Chicago, Reserve City banks, and Country banks. 
Data for non-member banks were not available with the completeness or the 
frequency necessary for testing. 
Use of these rather broad groupings of banks in empirical tests 
results in some unavoidable aggregation problems. Within each class, 
there will be differences in individual bank responses resulting from 
changes in exogenously determined variables such as expected profit rates, 
Dp, and excess reserves. These responses will vary depending on differ­
ences in bank location, competitive position, size, type of customer and 
other factors unique to each bank. 
Furthermore, the aggregate change in the exogenous variables may not 
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adequately reflect the change in an individual bank's situation; 
1. The relevant expected profit rates on particular assets will differ 
among banks within each Federal Reserve classification. Loan rates, 
for example, will not be homogeneous for all banks within the group. 
Even greater variation among banks would be likely for the expected 
yields on long-term assets — these will vary according to individual 
bank prospects for the future. 
2. The distribution of exogenously determined assets and liabilities will 
differ among banks. The deposit mix between time and demand deposits, 
the proportion of assets set aside as excess reserves and vault cash, 
and portfolio allocation among those interest-bearing assets which are 
held constant in the model will not be homogeneous for all banks within 
a class. 
3. The levels of a and p, the minimum acceptable levels of liquidity and 
soundness, will undoubtedly vary from bank to bank. They will depend 
on the bank's expectations of future needs and its degree of risk-
aversion. One other problem with regard to g may be mentioned here. 
In assuming that the minimum acceptable level for the ratio of capital 
to risk-assets is the ratio actually attained, we are implicitly 
assuming that all banks are sound. The data include banks which were 
failing, however, whose desired risk ratios were obviously higher than 
the ratios they actually achieved. To the extent thct such banks were 
included, the employment of the actual risk-asset ratio as the measure 
of p, the desired ratio, underestimates the latter's true value, and 
may result in prediction of larger asset portfolios than were consid­
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ered optimal. On the other hand, there were no doubt certain banks 
at any point of time whose risk-asset ratios had attained higher than 
desirable levels and who were in the process of adjusting them down­
ward. If these two opposing forces were of approximately the same 
magnitude, the predicted level of ^  will approach its appropriate 
value. 
Although each class of banks is far from homogeneous, we expect bank 
situations and responses to be more alike within than among classifica­
tions. The degree of homogeneity should be greater for banks in New York 
City and Chicago than for the broader groupings of Reserve City and 
Country banks. Banks within each Central Reserve City classification face 
the same discount rate, are contained within a relatively small geographic 
area and hence face similar local conditions, and are few in number rela­
tive to Reserve City and Country banks. We would therefore expect better 
predictions from the model for New York and Chicago banks than for the 
other two groups. 
The Data 
It seems likely that the banker makes decisions concerning his 
investment portfolio and borrowings at t on the basis of a rather short 
horizon. Assuming long horizons in an industry as volatile as banking, 
and particularly as volatile as banking during the 1930's, does not seem 
very realistic. Hence, we have assumed the shortest time horizon possible 
consistent with the data available. The sources for the majority of the 
data used in empirical tests were Banking and Monetary Statistics (9) and 
51 
various issues of the Federal Reserve Board's Annual Reports (48) and 
monthly Bulletins (49). 
In most cases, the data for yields and security prices were available 
as averages for the month. Linear interpolation was used to convert such 
data into estimates for the quarterly call dates, which were generally 
end-of-month dates. Each annual rate was then divided by four to put it 
on a quarterly basis. 
The prevailing rates on prime bankers' acceptances and on stock 
exchange time loans, each wich 90-day maturities, were employed as esti­
mated of E[r^l and E[rgl, respectively. For Treasury bills, we used the 
average yield on issues sold by the Treasury within the month. Treasury 
bills were first issued in December, 1929, and it was not until 1931 that 
monthly yields were available on a regular basis. Therefore, until 1931, 
the average yield on three- to six-month Treasury notes and certificates 
was used as a substitute for the profit rate on Treasury bills. For the 
classifications of New York City banks. Reserve City banks and Country 
banks, the discount rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York served as 
a measure of the cost of borrowing. For Chicago banks, however, the 
discount rate at the Reserve Bank of that city was employed. A published 
series of weighted average rates charged on customer's loans in principal 
cities provided the basis for E r^ . Prime commercial loans and loans to 
customers were included in computing the average. The average rate for 
New York City was given. As a proxy for the Chicago rate, we used the 
weighted average for eight northern and eastern cities, the largest of 
TxAiich was Chicago. The national average, which was composed of weighted 
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averages for New York City, the eight northern and eastern cities, and 
twenty-seven southern and western cities, was employed as the loan rate 
for Reserve City and Country banks. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the expected profit rate on investments 
with maturities greater than three months must take into account the 
expected capital gain. We assume that at t, the price expected for any 
given security at t+1 is a weighted average of current and past prices, 
with the weights attached declining as variables recede into the more 
distant past. We have no way of estimating these weights, but a convenient 
a priori assumption is that the weights found by Friedman (17, p. 147) in 
developing his measure of permanent income are also applicable here. 
Hence, the price expected for any security at t+1 = .33p^ + .221p^_^ ... + 
.001 p^ where p denotes price, and t, the current period. 
The market price of a security is a function of, among other things, 
its coupon rate and its term to maturity. The series of prices from which 
the expected price is computed must therefore be based on securities of 
equal maturity and coupon rate. Similarly, the current, price with which 
this expected price is compared to obtain the expected capital gain must 
bear the same coupon and maturity date as was used in calculating the 
expected prices. This amounts to assuming that, of the securities which 
a banker holds, all those of a given type are equivalent with respect to 
maturity, coupon and other features. Table 1 presents the features --
coupon rates, term to maturity, and others -- which were used in estimating 
market prices for the various types of securities in the model. 
53 
Table 1. Hypothetical characteristics of securities 
Type of security Coupon rate (%) Maturity Other features 
Municipal bonds 4 20 years 
U. S. Treasury 
bonds (until 1931) 4 16 years Tax exempt 
U. S. Treasury 
bonds (1931-1935) 2 3/4 16 years 
Railroad bonds 5 20 years 
Commercial paper, 
4-6 month 4 3 months 
U. S. Treasury notes 3 3 1/2 years Tax exempt 
Utility bonds 5 20 years 
The expected rate of return E[r' between t and t+1 for any one of 
these securities becomes: 
(4.1) E[r] = r/4 + (E[p^^^l - p^) .01 
where : 
r = coupon rate on the security 
expected price at t+1 
p^ = price of security at t 
The expected capital gain, (E[p^^^l - p^), is multiplied by .01 in order 
to put it on a percentage basis. 
Banking and Monetary Statistics (9) was the source for data on member 
bank assets and liabilities on the call dates. In some cases, the use 
made of this data requires a bit of explanation. The value of acceptances 
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includes total volume of acceptances payable in the U. S. and abroad 
held by the particular class of member banks. Loans to brokers and deal­
ers, S, is composed of such loans made to brokers and dealers both inside 
and outside New York City. D^, the value of loans to customers, was calcu­
lated by subtracting the sum of acceptances, commercial paper, and loans 
to brokers and dealers held by member banks from total loans. The sub­
tracted items are considered to be a measure of open market loans, acquired 
at the initiative of the bank rather than in response to loan demand by 
customers. Treasury bills, Ug, include certificates of indebtedness held 
by member banks through October, 1934. No such certificates were out­
standing for the remainder of the period. 
Borrowings for each of the classes of member banks are given in 
Banking and Monetary Statistics (9). However, these figures include 
borrowings from those other than Reserve Banks. Borrowings from Reserve 
Banks, by class of member bank, are available for most of the relevant 
call dates in various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin (49). For 
those dates where only total member bank borrowings, or only a partial 
breakdown of such borrowings, at Reserve Banks are given, the share of the 
undistributed portion accounted for by each class of bank was approximated. 
This was done by multiplying the percent of total borrowings (from Reserve 
Banks and others) accounted for by each class on the call date by the total 
member bank borrowings from the Reserve Banks. 
Testing Procedure and Empirical Results 
The model developed in Chapter III consists of a linear function to 
be maximized subject to three linear constraints, two of which are inequal­
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ities. As such, it was well suited to testing by linear programming 
techniques. The availability of the IBM linear programming package, 
MPS/360 LP, facilitated this testing. 
Initially, we employed the model to explain bank holdings of all 
11 variables specified in Equation 3.1 for the period 1928 to 1935. The 
results were not satisfactory since the optimal values of several variables 
were predicted to be zero. This outcome was probably due to the model's 
inability to differentiate between assets such as Treasury notes and 
Treasury bonds, except on the basis of the assumed expected profit rate. 
However, the banker no doubt does differentiate between these assets, as 
well as between different types of privately-issued bonds. He may operate 
under certain rules-of-thumb, such as no more than X percent of the port­
folio should be placed in governments, and no more than Y percent in rail­
road or utility bonds. The model we have developed is, in other words, an 
ad hoc theory of bank portfolio behavior, not intended to be a definitive 
statement of the subject. 
There are only three variables which the model must explain for it 
to be of use in predicting free gold and the money supply effects due to 
the hypothetical security purchase. These variables are acceptances, 
loans, and borrowings from Reserve Banks. We, therefore, constrained all 
variables except these three to their actual values on each particular 
call date. The results were greatly improved, with one exception. For 
quarters where actual borrowings exhibited severe fluctuations, the fluc­
tuations in the predicted values were excessively large, although they 
moved in the correct direction. For example, when actual borrowings 
dropped by 50 percent, predicted borrowings might decrease by 100 percent. 
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Profitable or not, changes as radical as some of those predicted would 
probably have been very difficult to accomplish within one three-month 
period. We therefore constrained the value of borrowings to fall within a 
maximum and minimum value for each quarter such that : 
(4.2) B 3 + (q+.l) 
and 
(4.3) B 3 - (q+.l) 
where: 
q = the actual percentage change in borrowings between t-1 and t 
Since, in almost all cases of poor prediction, the predicted change moved 
in the same direction as the actual change, but by too large an amount, 
the result of imposing these two constraints was to improve the prediction. 
The revised model becomes: 
Maximize: 
(3.1) E(TT) = E[r^] A + E[r^^] + E[r^: S + E[r^^] + Err^] + 
E[r^] M + EEr^] R + EFr^] U + E[rp] P + E[rQ ] + 
E[RB] B 
subject to: 
(3.8) A + S + U g + P - B  -  a v D ^  >  o ^ v D p  +  s T D )  -  E  -  V  
(3.10) A + S + M + R + U + P + D ^ K/p - 0 
L 1 
(3.16) A + s + U„ + U„ + u. + M + R + u + p - B = vDp + 
(4.2) B ^ Bfi + (q+'i) \.l 
(4.3) B s Bt_l - Bt_l 
(4.4) ^B = 
(4.5) S = 
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(4.6) I
I 
(4.7) I
I 
(4.8) g
 II 
(4.9) II 
(4.10) u = 
(4.11) p = p^ 
where J  • • •  J  
T 
Beginning with 1928 III, the first quarter for which complete data 
on member bank portfolios are provided, this revised model was tested 
quarterly through 1935 IV. Not surprisingly, the model predicted poorly 
until the first quarter of 1930. Abberrations in bank behavior would have 
been expected during the latter stages of the speculative boom and the 
subsequent stock market crash. Predicted and actual values of acceptances, 
loans, and borrowings for each of the four classes of banks over the period 
1930 I to 1935 IV are given in Tables 2 through 5. Table 6 contains the 
data presented in the four preceding tables summed over the four classes 
of banks; hence, it compares the predicted with the actual values of the 
variables for all member banks. 
Simple comparisons of actual and predicted values of acceptances, 
borrowings, and loans are not particularly revealing as to the explanatory 
ability of the model. To provide a better measure of the model's explana­
tory powers, a chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was employed. However, 
in order to perform the usual test, which assumes a central chi-square 
distribution, the sura of the predicted values must equal the sum of the 
observed values. If this requirement is not met, the distribution is 
Table 2. Central Reserve City banks in New York City: Comparison of predicted and actual values for 
acceptances, borrowings and loans (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Date Acceptances Borrowings from Reserve Banks Loans to customers 
Actual- Actual- Actual-
Year Quarter Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted 
1930 I 126 129 3 2 3 1 4,480 4,477 -3 
II 164 173 9 35 43 8 4,444 4,437 -7 
III 170 176 6 3 7 4 4,364 4,361 -3 
IV 204 210 6 15 20 5 4,522 4,518 -4 
1931 I 249 250 1 7 9 2 4,030 4,038 8 
II 340 340 0 4 5 1 3,851 3,862 11 
III 235 234 -1 14 13 -1 3,978 3,983 5 
IV 199 201 2 40 42 2 3,908 3,904 -4 
1932 I 307 311 4 18 22 4 3,413 3,410 -3 
II 419 421 2 0 2 2 2,914 2,915 1 
III 449 449 0 0 0 0 2,685 2,687 2 
IV 482 493 11 0 10 10 2,639 2,628 -11 
1933 I 418 424 6 0 5 5 2,458 2,465 7 
II 354 354 0 0 0 0 2,302 2,302 0 
III 420 420 0 0 0 0 2,352 2,352 0 
IV 318 317 -1 0 0 0 2,363 2,366 3 
1934 I 455 455 0 0 0 0 2,217 2,216 -1 
II 379 379 0 0 0 0 2,072 2,071 -1 
III 404 403 -1 0 0 0 2,147 2,151 4 
IV 390 390 0 0 0 0 2,047 2,047 0 
1935 I 368 367 -1 0 0 0 2,046 2,050 4 
II 272 272 0 0 0 0 2,054 2,054 0 
III 249 248 -1 0 1 1 2,055 2,060 5 
IV 282 281 -1 0 0 0 2,066 2,070 4 
Total 7,653 7,697 44 138 182 44 71,407 71,424 17 
Table 3. Central Reserve City banks in Chicago: Comparison of predicted and actual values for 
acceptances, borrowings and loans (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Date Acceptances Borrowings from Reserve Banks Loans to customers 
Actual- Actual- Actual-
Year Quarter Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted Actual Predicted predicted 
1930 I 14 14 0 0 0 0 1,026 1,025 -1 
II 21 21 0 0 0 0 1,078 1,078 0 
III 20 20 0 0 0 0 990 990 0 
IV 30 32 2 0 0 0 1,043 1,044 1 
1931 I 37 39 2 0 2 2 931 933 2 
II 45 45 0 0 0 0 940 940 0 
III 25 25 0 0 0 0 894 892 -2 
IV 23 23 0 0 0 0 879 879 0 
1932 I 23 24 1 0 3 3 811 819 8 
II 18 25 7 0 6 6 744 746 2 
III 41 41 0 3 4 1 606 607 1 
IV 51 50 -1 0 0 0 503 504 1 
1933 I 53 54 1 0 0 0 524 525 1 
II 58 58 0 0 0 0 546 546 0 
III 60 60 0 0 0 0 554 555 1 
IV 55 55 0 0 0 0 482 482 0 
1934 I 52 52 0 0 0 0 467 467 0 
II 36 35 -1 0 0 0 441 443 2 
III 46 45 -1 0 0 0 442 443 1 
IV 51 50 -1 0 0 0 399 410 11 
1935 I 29 29 0 0 0 0 428 429 1 
II 18 17 -1 0 0 0 418 420 2 
III 14 15 1 0 0 0 395 402 7 
IV 15 16 1 0 0 0 419 419 0 
Total 835 845 10 3 15 12 15,960 15,998 38 
Table 4. Reserve City member banks: Comparison of predicted and actual values for acceptances, 
borrowings and loans (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Date Acceptances Borrowings from Reserve Banks Loans to customers 
Actual- Actual- Actual-
Year Quarter Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted 
1930 I 59 79 20 9 33 24 7,597 7,635 38 
II 37 36 -1 41 42 1 7,542 7,568 26 
III 63 64 1 23 27 4 7,337 7,372 35 
IV 116 119 3 58 63 5 7,607 7,631 24 
1931 I 162 167 5 23 29 6 7,317 7,323 6 
II 110 113 3 9 12 3 7,068 7,065 -3 
III 80 77 -3 118 117 -1 6,853 6,871 18 
IV 42 68 26 231 257 26 6,573 6,565 -8 
1932 I 48 71 23 159 185 26 6,158 6,172 14 
II 53 73 20 95 113 18 5,793 5,781 -12 
III 77 86 9 65 76 11 5,541 5,561 20 
IV 84 82 -2 47 53 6 5,313 5,317 4 
1933 I 108 85 -23 26 31 5 4,536 4,783 247 
II 85 88 3 5 8 3 4,251 4,248 -3 
III 93 99 6 4 11 7 4,269 4,284 15 
IV 93 93 0 7 8 1 4,216 4,232 16 
1934 I 101 102 1 3 4 1 4,105 4,104 -1 
II 68 68 0 0 0 0 3,998 3,997 -1 
III 75 74 -1 0 0 0 4,005 4,006 1 
IV 183 71 -112 0 0 0 3,826 3,938 112 
1935 I 70 69 -1 0 1 1 3,869 3,890 21 
II 57 57 0 0 0 0 3,884 3,884 0 
III 70 69 1 0 0 0 3,987 3,997 10 
IV 77 75 -2 0 0 0 4,025 4,035 10 
Total 2,011 1,985 -26 923 1,070 147 129,670 130,259 589 
Table 5. Country member banks: Comparison of predicted and actual values for acceptances, borrowings 
and loans (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Date Acceptances Borrowings from Reserve Banks Loans to customers 
Actual- Actual- Actual-
Year Quarter Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted 
1930 I 6 31 25 146 171 25 8,181 8,179 -2 
II 0 12 12 174 189 15 8,164 8,200 36 
III 0 8 8 130 138 8 7,979 7,979 0 
IV 0 8 8 156 164 8 7,773 7,765 -8 
1931 I 0 7 7 116 126 10 7,474 7,519 45 
II 0 4 4 126 130 4 7,329 7,331 2 
III 21 3 -18 206 193 -13 6,972 7,040 68 
IV 0 10 ; 10 315 324 9 6,512 6,506 -6 
1932 I 0 14 14 358 322 -36 6,221 6,216 -5 
II 0 18 18 302 319 17 5,940 5,927 -13 
III 0 14 14 237 251 14 5,682 5,691 9 
IV 0 5 5 166 172 6 5,430 5,437 7 
1933 I 0 7 7 118 132 14 4,694 4,826 132 
II 0 8 8 80 91 11 4,174 4,215 41 
III 0 7 7 66 73 7 4,200 4,193 -7 
IV 2 9 7 60 67 7 4,140 4,143 3 
1934 I 10 17 7 28 35 7 4,122 4,117 -5 
II 6 10 4 16 19 3 4,032 4,031 -1 
III 10 13 3 8 10 2 3,937 3,934 -3 
IV 7 9 2 6 7 1 3,860 3,860 0 
1935 I 9 10 1 4 5 1 3,791 3,792 1 
II 4 7 3 4 6 2 3,801 3,805 4 
III 8 8 0 4 5 1 3,742 3,763 21 
IV 8 7 -1 4 4 0 3,740 3,756 16 
Total 91 246 155 2,830 2,953 123 131,890 132,225 335 
Table 6. All member banks: Comparison of predicted and actual values for acceptances, borrowings 
and loans (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Date Acceptances Borrowings from Reserve Banks Loans to customers 
Actual- Actual- Actual-
Year Quarter Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted Predicted Actual predicted 
1930 I 205 253 48 157 207 50 21,284 21,316 32 
II 213 242 29 250 274 24 21,228 21,282 54 
III 253 268 15 156 172 16 20,670 20,702 32 
IV 350 369 19 229 247 18 20,945 20,958 13 
1931 I 448 463 15 146 166 20 19,752 19,813 61 
II 495 502 7 139 147 8 19,188 19,197 9 
III 361 339 22 338 323 -15 18,697 18,786 89 
IV 264 302 38 586 623 37 17,872 17,854 -18 
1932 I 378 420 42 535 532 -3 16,603 16,617 14 
II 490 537 47 397 440 43 15,391 15,369 -22 
III 567 590 23 305 331 26 14,514 14,546 32 
IV 617 630 13 213 235 22 13,885 13,886 1 
1933 I 579 570 -9 144 168 24 12,212 12,599 387 
II 497 508 11 85 107 22 11,273 11,311 38 
III 573 586 13 70 84 14 11,375 11,384 9 
IV 468 474 6 67 75 8 11,201 11,223 22 
1934 I 618 616 -2 31 39 8 10,911 10,904 -7 
II 489 492 3 16 19 3 10,543 10,542 -1 
III 535 535 0 8 10 2 10,531 10,534 3 
IV 631 520 -111 6 7 1 10,132 10,255 123 
1935 I 476 475 -1 4 6 2 10,134 10,161 27 
II 351 353 2 4 6 2 10,157 10,163 6 
III 342 340 -2 4 6 2 10,179 10,222 43 
IV 382 379 3 4 4 0 10,250 10,280 30 
Total 10,582 10,763 181 3,894 4,228 334 348,927 349,904 977 
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non-central (33). Because the sums of predicted and actual values in our 
tests differed, it was necessary to make an adjustment for non-centrality 
before applying the central chi-square test. 
A central chi-square has a mean of f and a variance of 2f, where 
f is the degrees of freedom. The non-central chi-square has a mean of 
f+L and variance of 2(f+2L ) where L is called the non-centrality 
o o o 
parameter. The most theoretically satisfactory method of estimating the 
degree of noncentrality is to estimate both the parameters f and 
simultaneously by using, for example, maximum likelihood methods. However, 
this leads to very complicated nonlinear equations. Therefore, we have 
employed a second method suggested by Professor J. K. Sengupta,^ Wiich 
seeks to adjust for the effects of noncentrality in order to derive a 
revised estimate of the parameter f. This method has been employed by 
Professor Sengupta in some of his studies (41) on stochastic programming. 
The technique consists of defining an adjustment factor such that: 
(4.12) 
where ; 
n 
0. = i*"^ observed value 
1 
predicted value 
n = number of observations 
^Sengupta, J. K. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Non-central 
chi-square distribution. Private communication, 1969. 
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The value of f is then adjusted for noncentrality by adding to it the 
value of 2 X,- After this modification, the usual central chi-square test 
may be applied. This method, it should be emphasized, is only approximate, 
but it has the merit of being simple and operational. 
For each of the three variables — acceptances, loans and borrow­
ings — the hypothesis that the model predicts the actual value of the 
variable is tested. This hypothesis is rejected at a particular level of 
significance when the calculated chi-square exceeds the tabulated value at 
that level. In this case, the calculated chi-square is said to be signifi­
cant. The better the fit of the model, the fewer will be the significant 
chi-squares obtained. In most of the tests, a .95 level of significance 
was employed. A summary of the significance tests is provided in Table 7, 
and a description of the results is contained in the following paragraphs. 
As we expected, the model did a better job of predicting A, and B 
for New York City and for Chicago banks than for the other two classes. 
Furthermore, it explained the behavior of country banks better than that 
of banks under the Reserve City classification. For New York City and 
Chicago banks, the chi-square values for A and are not significant at 
the .95 level, if even without adjustment for noncentrality. Hence, at 
this level of significance, we do not reject the hypothesis that our 
model explains bank holdings of these two assets during the period 1930-
1935. 
^If we were adjusting the variance of a central chi-square for the 
effect of non-centrality using this approximation, the estimated variance 
would become 2(f+2X). Since the mean of a central chi-square is half its 
variance, f is adjusted by 2^ rather than 
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Table 7. The results of chi-square goodness-of-fit tests 
Variables for which the chi-square was 
not significant at a level of; 
Class of bank .95 .975 .99 .995 
New York City A 
B 
Chicago A 
Reserve City A^ 
Country 
B 
All Member banks 
B 
A 
^Omitting 1934 IV. 
^Omitting 1930 I. 
The application of the goodness-of-fit test to borrowings for the 
two Central Reserve City classes was not entirely appropriate because a 
zero (less than $500 thousand) level of borrowings was predicted for a 
number of quarters. A chi-square test for New York City banks was per­
formed by combining quarters 1932 I through 1935 IV into one class, thus 
reducing the degrees of freedom by 15- The calculated chi-square was not 
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significant at the .995 level, although it exceeded the tabulated value 
at a .95 level. As an alternative test, the average absolute percentage 
deviation of predicted from actual borrowings was computed, which yielded 
a value of 25 percent. This test seems no more adequate than the chi-
square, since due to the very small values of both predicted and actual 
B, any deviation appears as a rather sizeable percent. It can be seen by 
inspection that the errors in prediction in absolute terms were quite 
small. For Chicago banks, the difficulty was even greater. In order to 
perform a chi-square test, it is generally recommended that if the pre­
dicted value for any one class is no greater than 3, that class should be 
combined with another. However, for Chicago banks, the sum of predicted 
borrowings for all quarters was only 3. It was clearly impossible to use 
the goodness-of-fit test, but the model predicted the borrowings by 
Chicago banks reasonably well. For 20 of 24 quarters, the actual level 
of borrowings was zero, and this was the value predicted by the model for 
each of those quarters. 
The calculated chi-square for acceptances held by Reserve City banks 
was well above the tabulated value at a .95 significance level. However, 
the difference is primarily due to the predictive error in one quarter — 
1934 IV. This quarter contributed more than half the total of the calcu­
lated chi-square. Eliminating this period, the chi-square value is no 
longer significant at a .99 level, although it still exceeds the tabled 
value for a .95 level of significance. 
As for New York City and Chicago banks, several quarters of predicted 
borrowings by Reserve City banks had to be combined before testing for 
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goodness-of-fit. The predicted values for 1934 I through 1935 IV were, 
with one exception, all zero. A sizeable prediction error in 1930 I 
produced a rather large chi-square value. For that quarter, predicted 
borrowing was well below actual. Perhaps this was due to a greater than 
normal desire for liquidity on the part of Reserve City banks as a result 
of the recent stock market crash. Omitting this quarter, the chi-square 
value for borrowings is no longer significant at a .95 level. Loans to 
customers were well-predicted for Reserve City banks, as they were for the 
Central Reserve City banks. Even without adjustment for noncentrality, 
the calculated chi-square was not significant at the level of .95. 
Again using .95 as the level of significance, we can assert that the 
model performed well in predicting Country bank borrowings and loans. 
Without adjustment for the effect of noncentrality, neither variable had a 
significant chi-square value. However, the chi-square test revealed a 
much poorer fit for acceptances held than for the other two Country bank 
variables. The calculated chi-square was significant at all levels. One 
reason for this was that the necessity of combining the large number of 
classes for which zero acceptance holdings were predicted greatly reduced 
the degrees of freedom and hence the tabulated chi-square value. This is 
not the entire explanation, however. Although Country banks held rela­
tively few acceptances during this period, the model estimates even smaller 
optimal holdings in almost every quarter. One possible reason for this 
might be that the relevant acceptance rate for Country banks was greater 
than the open market rate in New York City, which was the rate employed 
in tests. 
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Chi-square tests were also performed on the combined results for all 
member banks. The calculated chi-squares for loans and borrowings of all 
member banks were not significant at the .95 level. In fact, as had been 
true for each class individually, the chi-square for loans did not show 
significance even when no adjustment for noncentrality was performed. 
Moreover, broadening the period to include 1928 III to 1929 IV did not 
affect these results for loans. Due to the errors in prediction for 
Reserve City and Country banks, the chi-square value for acceptances held 
by all member banks was significant at the .95 level, although the 
significance disappeared at a .975 level. 
The model developed in Chapter III, with the slight modifications 
described in this chapter, appears to do an adequate job of explaining 
member bank acceptance holdings, loans and borrowings from Reserve Banks 
during the period 1930-1935. As anticipated, its best performance was 
for the least aggregative groups of banks -- Central Reserve City banks 
in New York City and Chicago. It seems likely that the poorer explanatory 
ability for Reserve City and Country banks is at least partially due to 
the aggregation problems discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
For every class of bank, the model performed best in explaining the largest 
of the three variables — customer loans. 
In the following chapter we will employ the model to predict bank 
behavior under hypothetical circumstances rather than to explain actual 
behavior, as was done in this chapter. There we will alter certain of the 
exogenous variables under the assumption of a hypothetical $1 billion 
open market purchase, and will predict the resulting optimal values of 
A, and B. 
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CHAPTER V. FREE GOLD, THE MONEY SUPPLY AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY 
Professors Friedman and Schwartz have suggested that a more forceful 
Federal Reserve policy in late 1931 -- namely, the purchase of $1 billion 
in government securities — could have been of great assistance in slowing 
the rapid deterioration of economic conditions. Such a policy would, by 
their calculations, have stabilized the money stock, and could have been 
pursued without endangering the free gold position of the Reserve Banks. 
With the aid of the model developed in Chapter III and tested in Chapter 
IV, we will now subject these assertions to a test. We will attempt to 
determine what quantitative effect an open market operation of this size 
would have had on the money supply and on free gold. 
A secondary purpose of this chapter will be to investigate the 
propitiousness of three alternatives which Friedman and Schwartz claim 
could have been pursued by the System to relieve the free gold problem — 
had free gold been regarded as a problem. The potential effect on free 
gold of a reduction in Reserve Bank till money to a minimum -- the quanti­
tative effects of which were estimated in Chapter II -- will be discussed 
briefly here. Secondly, Friedman and Schwartz assert that the Reserve 
Banks could have purchased bills rather than governments had the level of 
free gold been considered an insurmountable obstacle to open market opera­
tions. A third and untouched possibility was to encourage member bank 
borrowing. In the concluding section of this chapter are presented a few 
observations on the more qualitative aspects of the Friedman-Schwartz 
argument which are contained in Points 1, 2, 3 and 5 on pages 8 and 9. 
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Preliminary Assumptions 
Suppose that from August through December, 1931 the Reserve Banks had 
engaged in a large open market purchase program, resulting at the end of 
the year in System holdings $1 billion larger than were actual holdings on 
that date. Given a constant volume of U. S. Government debt outstanding, 
these securities would have been obtained partly from member banks and 
partly from non-member banks and other holders of the debt. The model 
contains, as constrained variables, the amount of U. S. Government bills, 
notes and bonds held by each class of member bank. The values of these 
variables will change as securities are sold to the System by member banks, 
and a procedure is needed for estimating the volume of such sales. We 
first calculate the amount of governments available to the private sector, 
and this quantity is termed G^, 
C5.1) «X = CG . GC - GG 
where : 
GQ = total U. S. Government debt outstanding 
Gg = U. S. Government securities held by federal agencies and 
trust funds 
Gg = U. S. Government securities held by Federal Reserve Banks 
The percent of G^ accounted for by each of the four classes of member 
banks on two dates: December 31, 1931, and June 30, 1932 was then 
computed. These percentages are presented in Table 8. 
We will consider two alternative assumptions as to the effect of the 
security purchase on member bank portfolios of governments: (1) The per­
centage of G^ held by each group of banks is unchanged by the purchase; 
hence, the first row of Table 8 becomes relevant; (2) the percentage of 
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Table 8. Percent of held by each class of member bank 
Central Reserve City 
member banks: Reserve City Country 
Date New York City Chicago member banks member banks 
December 31, 1931 10.9 1.8 11.4 8.8 
June 30, 1932 12.0 1.4 11.6 8.5 
held by each class of bank is altered by the Federal Reserve purchase by 
an amount equal to the actual change between December, 1931, and June, 
1932, during which time System holdings did rise by approximately $1 
billion. For this case we employ the second row of Table 8. These two 
assumptions will be referred to as Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, respec­
tively, throughout the remainder of this paper. 
The purchase program would have reduced by $1 billion. Multi­
plying each of the percentages in Table 8 by the new value for G^ yields 
the hypothetical government security holdings of each banking class. 
Between December, 1931, and June of the following year, the Reserve 
Banks increased their holdings of all three types of Treasury securi­
ties — bills, notes and bonds. Of the total change of $967 million, 
bills accounted for 67.6 percent, notes for 24.5 percent, and bonds for 
only 8.1 percent. Operating on the premise that the purchase would have 
been distributed in the same manner had it been completed six months 
earlier, and assuming that the sales by member banks are distributed in 
the same manner as Federal Reserve purchases, the hypothetical holdings 
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of bills, notes and bonds for each group of member banks were calculated. 
These results are presented in Table 9. 
The term G in Table 9 is defined as the total value of government 
securities held by a particular class of bank. Hence, G = U + U„ + U . 
B N G 
The values in the first column under each heading — New York City, 
Chicago, etc. — were derived with the use of Assumption 1. In each case, 
second column values were estimated under Assumption 2. 
Certain of the other exogenous variables in the model should be 
affected by the System's purchase. These include E, Dp and TD. To the 
extent that member banks sell governments to the Reserve Banks and retain 
the proceeds as deposits in those banks rather than lending them, excess 
reserves will rise. If the non-bank public deposits the proceeds of its 
security sales in member banks, and/or TD will rise, and ceteris 
paribus, excess reserves will be augmented by v A D^ and/or s A TD. The 
problem is that the ceteris paribus assumption will not hold. Member banks 
are sure to employ some of their newly created reserves to acquire inter­
est-earning assets or to repay borrowings. Part of the funds received 
by the non-bank public from its sales of securities will no doubt be held 
as currency, or will be deposited in non-member rather than member banks. 
Some method for predicting the change in D^, E and TD is needed. 
It will be assumed that completion of the purchase program by 
December 31, 1931, would have produced the same rate of expansion in E and 
D as occurred between that month and June, 1932. Both E and D for 
P P 
member banks declined during the period immediately preceding the 1932 
operation and rose while the purchase proceeded, as would be expected. 
Table 9. Government securities held by member banks: Hypothetical sales (purchases) and hypothetical 
holdings (figures in millions of dollars) 
Hypothetical change : 
All government 
securities (G) 
Treasury bills (U^)^ 
Treasury notes (U^^)^ 
Treasury bonds (U )^ 
f 
Hypothetical holdings ; 
All government 
securities 
Treasury bills (Ug) 
Treasury notes (U^) 
Treasury bonds (U^) 
New York City Chicago Reserve City Country All member 
banks banks banks banks banks 
Assump- Assumpr Assump- Assumpr Assump- Assumpr Assump- Assumpr Assump- Assumpr 
tion 1^ tioji 2 tion 1^ tion 2 tion 1^ tion 2 tion 1^ tion 2 tion 1^ tion 2 
-114 53 -15 -76 -114 -83 -82 -128 -325 -235 
-77 36 -10 -51 -77 -56 -55 1 00
 
-219 -158 
-28 13 -4 -19 -28 -20 -20 -31 -80 -57 
-9 4 -1 -6 -9 -7 -7 -10 -26 -19 
1,654 1,821 273 212 1,730 1,761 1,336 1,290 4,993 5,084 
131 326 142 101 110 131 0^ 0® 465 558 
1,310 172 35 20 82 90 107 64 355 346 
1,654 1,323 97 92 1,539 1,541 1,228 1,225 4,174 4,181 
^Using December 31, 1931 values for the percent of G held. 
B 
Using June 30, 1932 values for the percent of G„ held. 
C.676 A G. 
^,245 A G. 
^.081 A G. 
^Actual values + hypothetical change. 
%he value of U^ held by Country banks in December, 1931, was only 50. 
tion of Ug in excess of this amount was shifted to Uj^. 
The hypothetical reduc-
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It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the expansion of E and 
was largely due to the System's policy, and that an effect of similar 
magnitude would have resulted from adoption of the policy six months 
sooner. The path of time deposits differed from that of E and however. 
They declined both before and during the 1932 purchase program, and con­
tinued to decline until 1933. It appears that the more vigorous policy had 
little effect in stopping, much less reversing, the downward trend of time 
deposits. We will therefore assume that a similar policy adopted in 1931 
would have had no significant effect on the level of time deposits. 
Because little accuracy can be claimed for these estimated changes 
in E and D^, a range of + and - 10 percent will be assigned to the predicted 
values. The maximum potential change in each of these variables is 
assumed to be the actual change plus 10 percent, and the minimum change to 
be the actual change less 10 percent. The model was tested with each of 
these three combinations of E and D . 
P 
In Chapter II, we discussed the estimates given by Friedman and 
Schwartz (18) as to the effect of a hypothetical security purchase on the 
money supply. Their calculations are summarized in Table 10. 
The $231 million expansion of currency in circulation which Friedman 
and Schwartz predict has been accepted as a reasonable estimate. Further­
more, it is postulated as a simplifying assumption that non-member bank 
deposits, which accounted for 22.24 percent of total deposits in December, 
1931, rise by 22.24 percent of the total deposit increase of $4,728 billion 
which Friedman and Schwartz predict. In order for the money supply to 
remain stable, member bank deposits must therefore rise by 3.676 billion 
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Table 10. Money supply effect hypothesized by Friedman and Schwartz 
(figures are in billions of dollars) 
Variable 
Hypothetical 
value 
(January, 1932) 
Actual 
value 
(January, 1932) 
Hypothetical 
change 
M 
C 
D 
41.525 
5.127 
36.398 
36.566 
4.896 
31.670 
4.959 
.231 
4.728 
dollars. The exogenous variables in the model must be at levels which 
will make this expansion possible. 
The mean value assumed for the rise in D for all member banks is 
P 
$572 million. Since a zero change in time deposits has been assumée* the 
model must allow for a potential increase in of 3.104 billion dollars.^ 
An alteration in the December, 1931 value for the soundness constraint, 
2 
Equation 3.10, is necessary to allow this possibility. If capital 
accounts, the risk-asset ratio, and the quantity 0^ are unaffected by the 
purchase, can rise only to the extent that member banks are holding 
acceptances. It seems unlikely that the open market purchase would have 
much effect on capital or on 0^^, which is comprised largely of non-interest 
earning assets. However, if an easy money policy caused bankers to expect 
fewer bank failures and a better business climate, and to believe that 
^Since D = D_ + D . 
L p 
^(3.10) A + S+ M + R+ U+ P+Dj^^ K/p-0^. 
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loans and other investments have become less risky, the result might well 
be a reduction in the desired risk-asset ratio. In order to allow the 
possibility of money supply stability as the consequence of an open market 
purchase, it is assumed that p, the minimum acceptable risk-asset ratio, 
declines to the extent necessary for potential to expand by $3,104 
billion. 
Several calculations are necessary in order to arrive at estimates 
of the reduced value of p for each class of member bank. We first estimate 
the necessary rise in total deposits, D, for each class of bank, assuming 
that deposits for each class rise in proportion to the percent of total 
member bank deposits accounted for by that class in December, 1931. From 
this amount is subtracted the mean hypothetical change in for each 
class. This yields the potential rise in D^, by class of bank, necessary 
for stability of the money stock. Since banks can substitute loans for 
acceptances in their portfolios, has a potential for expansion equal to 
bank holdings of acceptances without any decline in the risk-asset ratio. 
The excess of the required potential change in over bank holdings of 
acceptances is the rise in which must be facilitated through reductions 
in the risk-asset ratio. The necessary changes in the desired risk-asset 
ratios of each class of member bank are presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Actual and hypothetical risk-asset ratios for December 31, 1931 
Central Reserve City Reserve City Country 
member banks : member banks member banks 
Risk-asset 
ratio New York City Chicago 
Actual value .282 .203 .199 .193 
Hypothetical 
value .266 .169 .180 .173 
Actual-
hypothetical .016 .034 .019 .020 
Money Supply Effects of the Hypothetical Open Market Operation 
Using the hypothetical values of Ug, U^, E, Dp, TD and P derived 
in the preceding section, the model was re-estimated for December, 1931. 
Employing in turn, each of Assumptions 1 and 2 to estimate Ug, and 
in conjunction with each of the three hypothetical values for E and Dp 
yielded six sets of results for each class of bank. To simplify the 
reader's task, the assumptions discussed in the preceding section which 
concern variables in the model are summarized in Table 12. The assumptions 
regarding Dp and E are identified by numbers, as are those pertaining to 
U„, U„ and U„, which continue to bear numbers 1 and 2. These numbers will 
B G N 
be utilized in presenting test results. 
In Table 13, the six sets of results obtained for each class of member 
bank are presented. The values under the heading "All member banks" 
represent the sum of the values for each separate class. The last three 
columns of the table show the predicted changes in total member bank A, 
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Table 12. Assumptions used in predicting free gold and money supply 
effects 
Variable Assumption 
^B' "G 
1. The percent of held by each class of bank 
remains unchanged at its December, 1931 level. 
2. The percent of G^ held by each class of bank 
acquires its June, 1932 value. 
E and Dp 3. Changes by 100 percent of the actual change between 
December, 1931 and June, 1932. 
4. Changes by 110 percent of the actual change between 
December, 1931 and June, 1932. 
5. Changes by 90 percent of the actual change between 
December, 1931 and June, 1932. 
TD No change 
P Declines to the extent necessary to allow an expan­
sion of D^ by $3.104 billion 
and B as a result of the security purchase under each of the assumption 
sets. 
Table 14 contains the estimates used to draw conclusions regarding 
the effect of the $1 billion purchase on the money supply. The total 
hypothetical change in member bank deposits under each of the six assump­
tion sets is presented there. This change is the sum of the change in Dp 
estimated under Assumption 3, 4 or 5 plus the change in predicted by 
the model under the corresponding assumed value for Dp. On page 74, we 
Table 13. Predicted effects on acceptances, loans and borrowings of a $1 billion open market purchase 
(figures are in millions of dollars) 
Central Reserve City member banks ; Country member banks 
New York City Chicago 
Predicted value of: Predicted value of; Predicted value of; 
Assumptions 
used Acceptances Loans Borrowings Acceptances Loans Borrowings Acceptances Loans Borrowings 
1 and 3 362 4,248 0 0 355 .11 0 7,490 257 
1 and 4 378 4,232 0 0 409 .11 0 7,560 257 
1 and 5 347 4,263 0 0 301 .11 0 3,757 43 
2 and 3 185 4,325 0 7 768 0 0 7,696 226 
2 and 4 201 4,309 0 12 787 0 0 7,696 221 
2 and 5 170 4,340 0 2 750 0 0 7,696 230 
^The numbers used for assumptions correspond to those given in Table 12. 
Table 13 (Continued) 
Reserve City member banks All member banks All member banks 
Predicted value of; Predicted value of; Predicted change^ in; 
Assumptions 
used Acceptances Loans Borrowings Acceptances Loans Borrowings Acceptances Loans Borrowings 
1 and 3 61 7,578 0 423 19,671 257 111 1,817 -366 
1 and 4 88 7,551 0 466 19,752 257 164 1,898 -366 
1 and 5 35 7,604 0 382 15,925 43 80 -1,929 -580 
2 and 3 27 7,612 0 219 20,401 226 -83 2,547 -397 
2 and 4 53 7,586 0 266 20,378 221 -36 2,524 -402 
2 and 5 11 7,639 0 183 20,425 230 -130 2,571 -393 
^Hypothetical value less actual value on December 31, 1931. 
'^Compare these predictions for ^  and ^ with the assumptions of Friedman and Schwartz. With 
one exception, the model predicts a lesser decline in B than the $560 million assumed by Friedman and 
Schwartz. In no case is an increase in Ap(= -M) predicted which is as large as the $210 million that 
Friedman and Schwartz assume. 
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Table 14. Comparison of the predicted change in member bank deposits with 
the estimated change necessary for money supply stability 
(figures are in millions of dollars) 
All member banks 
+ A Dp 
$3.676 
billion 
Assumptions : A Dp = A D - A D 
1 and 3 1,817 . 572 2,389 1,287 
1 and 4 1,898 650 2,548 1,128 
1 and 5 -1,929 494 -1,435 5,111 
2 and 3 2,547 572 3,119 557 
2 and 4 2,524 650 3,174 502 
2 and 5 2,571 494 3,065 611 
noted that, given the hypothetical increase in currency of $231 million 
and an expansion of non-member bank deposits by 22.24 percent of the 
necessary deposit increase, member bank deposits must be inflated by 
$3.676 billion to produce stability of the money stock. In the last 
column of Table 14, the predicted increase in member bank deposits is 
subtracted from $3.676 billion, yielding estimates of the extent to which 
the money stock would have declined between August, 1931, and December 31, 
1931, even with the stimulation produced by an additional $1 billion open 
market purchase. 
As can be seen from Table 14, in no case is the estimated rise in 
member bank deposits sufficient to arrest the decline in the money stock. 
This is true even accepting the Friedman-Schwartz estimate of the rise in 
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currency, and granting rather liberal possibilities for the expansion of 
non-member bank deposits and the decline in p, the desired risk-asset 
ratio. The maximum predicted increase in the December, 1931 value of 
member bank deposits is $3,174 billion which implies a decline in the 
money stock of $502 million between August and December of that year. The 
mean prediction is for a deterioration in the money supply of $1,533 
million. Should non-member bank deposits have risen at a rate in line 
with that predicted for member banks, rather than at a much more rapid 
rate which was assumed, the decline in the money stock between August and 
December would have been even greater than is indicated in Table 14. And 
there is no particular reason to expect that an open market operation 
would have been more stimulating to non-member than to member banks. The 
conclusion to which this analysis leads is that, contrary to the assertions 
of Friedman and Schwartz, an open market purchase of $1 billion under­
taken during the closing months of 1931 would have been insufficient to 
halt the decline in the supply of money. 
One other observation as to money supply effects seems relevant here. 
When System holdings of government securities rose by $1 billion between 
January and July, 1932, the money stock did not cease its downward plunge. 
The estimates of Friedman and Schwartz (18, p. 713) are that the money 
stock dropped by approximately $2.5 billion between January and July. 
This result, according to Friedman and Schwartz (18, p. 347) was largely 
due to a renewed outflow of gold, mainly to France, during the spring and 
early summer of 1932; and to a sudden flurry of bank failures in June 
which produced further declines in the deposit-currency and deposit-
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reserve ratios. One factor could have been largely responsible for these 
offsets to Reserve System policy — the withdrawal of gold by France, 
whose short-term balances in the U. S. had all but evaporated by June, 
1932. This raid on gold might well have been precipitated by the purchase 
program itself, if the easy money policy caused France to lose confidence 
in the ability of the U. S. to remain on the gold standard. The gold 
outflow no doubt put pressure on individual commercial banks, and may have 
been responsible for many of the bank failures of June, 1932. Fear 
generated by bank failures would then have encouraged the public to step 
up its currency withdrawals, and banks to maintain a larger proportion of 
their assets as excess reserves — hence, the declines in the deposit 
ratios. This one-factor explanation of conditions in 1932 is no doubt 
an oversimplification: But the point is that a similar sequence of 
events, beginning with the withdrawal of French balances, might easily 
have occurred in 1931 had the purchase been- undertaken at that time. The 
effect would have been an even greater decline in the money stock between 
August and December, 1931, than that which has been predicted. 
Effect of the Hypothetical Purchase on Free Gold 
The predicted change in free gold is determined by substituting the 
estimated values for A and A Into Equations 2.26 and 2.27, which are 
duplicated below: 
(2.26) A Gp = $331.34 million + .5525(A + A A^) 
3 
(2.27) AG- = -$222.34 million + .5525(49* + A A„) 
^B 
To simplify presentation of the results, it is assumed that borrow­
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ings from the Reserve Banks, B^, are altered by exactly the amount of the 
change in member bank borrowings, B, and that System holdings of accept­
ances, Ap, change by the negative of the change in member bank holdings, 
A- The first assumption implies that non-member bank borrowings are 
unaffected by the open-market purchase, while the second implies no change 
in the acceptance holdings of anyone other than member banks and the 
Reserve System. We will return to these assumptions after discussing 
their implications for the value of free gold. 
Under these assumptions A ^ A^, in Equations 2.25 and 2.27 equals 
A B - A A predicted by the model. We have six hypothetical values for 
A B - A A, corresponding to each of the sets of assumptions regarding 
governments, excess reserves and Dp held by member banks. There are two 
possible values, given in 2.26 and 2.27, for the sum of other changes in 
the free gold equation. There are therefore 12 possibilities for the 
change in free gold resulting from the security purchase. These are 
presented in Table 15. 
At the end of 1931 free gold was approximately $600 million. The 
minimum decline in free gold predicted under any set. of assumptions is 
$367,65 million, which would have reduced free gold to only slightly more 
than $225 million. The mean decrease under the assumption that the mini­
mum necessary value for till money in Reserve Banks was 10 percent of 
notes in circulation (Equation 2.26) is $571.68 million. Such a reduction 
in December, 1931 would have reduced free gold to an almost non-existent 
level. If vault cash could have dropped to 6 percent of Reserve note 
circulation (Equation 2.27), a mean decline of $462.68 million in free 
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Table 15. Predicted effects of a hypothetical security purchase on free 
gold (figures are in millions of dollars) 
Assumption 
A B - A A = 
(A Bp + A Ap) 
.5525 
(A B - A A) 
Equation 
2.26 
< A G p  >  
a 
Equation 
2.27 
( A G  )  
FB 
1 and 3 -314 -173.48 -504.82 -395.82 
1 and 4 -365 -202.22 -533.56 -424.56 
1 and 5 -263 -145.31 -476.65 -367.65 
2 and 3 -477 -263.54 -594.88 -485.88 
2 and 4 -530 -292.83 -623.17 -515.17 
2 and 5 -660 -364.65 -695.99 -586.99 
Average -435 -240.34 -571.68 -462.68 
gold is predicted. Free gold would consequently have fallen to approxi­
mately $135 million -- a level lower than had ever been known. 
If non-member bank borrowings were reduced as a result of the Sys­
tem's purchase, which would be a likely consequence, the decline in free 
gold under each assumption is correspondingly greater. Under some 
assumptions, the model predicts a decrease in A. If these acceptances are 
sold to those other than Reserve Banks, Ap will not rise as assumed, and 
free gold will be depleted more than is indicated. Moreover, if some 
reduction in the gold stock, such as occurred during the first six months 
of 1932 when the French withdrew short-term balances of $500 million, were 
to result fr: ..1 open market operations in 1931, the free gold position 
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would deteriorate further. The evidence indicates that an open market 
purchase of $1 billion carried out between August and December, 1931, 
would have very likely eliminated free gold completely. Free gold was 
not adequate to bear the additional strain. 
A closely related potential effect of open market purchases in late 
1931 was the possibility of a shortage in reserves against deposits. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, it was this contingency rather than a shortage of 
free gold over which Goldenweiser (20) expressed anxiety. The excess or 
deficiency of reserves available against deposits can be defined as: 
(5.2) = R - Gp - .350 
where : 
Gp = total gold pledged exclusively against Federal Reserve 
notes = gold in the redemption fund and with Federal 
Reserve Agents 
E^ = excess of reserves available against deposits 
If gold in the redemption fund and with Federal Reserve Agents were 
precisely equal to gold required for these purposes, there would be no 
difference between free gold and E^. In practice, however, the gold held 
against notes was always in excess of the amount required in order to 
minimize the nuisance of having to make frequent deposits and withdrawals 
with Reserve Agents and the redemption fund. Furthermore, the Reserve 
Banks were particularly strongly committed to preventing any deficiency 
from occurring in the reserve against notes, for such a deficiency legally 
obligated the Reserve Banks to increase the discount rate and to pay a 
progressive tax on the deficiency to the Federal Government. If the 
Reserve Banks continued to maintain a cushion for gold pledged against 
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notes, and large open market operations had been carried out in 1931, a 
deficiency in the reserve against deposits would have resulted well before 
free gold were eliminated. 
Alternative Policies 
The reduction of counter cash 
It is improbable that the Reserve Banks could have reduced till money 
to less Ehan 6 percent of Federal Reserve notes in circulation in Decem­
ber, 1931. This was the value assumed in estimating Equation 2.27. The 
Board's statement of February, 1932, implied that 6 percent was the mini­
mum ratio required "as an operating matter." (48, 1932, p. 18) Since 
seasonal currency demands would have been greater in December than in 
February, the minimum necessary ratio should certainly have been no lower 
in December. Therefore, I believe the estimates given under A G in 
Fb 
Table 15 take into account the extent to which the reduction of vault cash 
could have alleviated the free gold problem. If 6 percent were indeed the 
minimum ratio needed, however, it is true that the Reserve Banks did not 
exploit this alternative to the full, for till money was never less than 
10 percent of Reserve note circulation during the months immediately 
preceding the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
The encouragement of member bank borrowing 
If the System had regarded free gold as a serious barrier to open 
market operations, Friedman and Schwartz contend, it could have encouraged 
member bank borrowing. Borrowing, by adding to Reserve Bank holdings of 
eligible paper, would have increased the value of free gold. Presumably, 
Friedman and Schwartz are suggesting the use of this policy in conjunction 
with open market operations, for it is clear that a policy of encouraging 
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borrowings would, by itself, have done very little to improve economic 
conditions. 
These authors state (18, p. 395) that the Reserve Banks paid only 
"lip service" to the lend-freely dictum which was an essential component 
of Bagehot's prescription for dealing with the twin evils of internal and 
external crises. In rebuttal to Friedman and Schwartz, we note that by 
early 1931, System officials were recommending a change in the Federal 
Reserve Act to allow member banks to borrow more easily. It was suggested 
that borrowing be allowed on member banks' own promissory notes secured by 
non-eligible collateral. Changes similar to those recommended were later 
embodied in the Glass-Steagall Act. It appears, then, that Reserve offi­
cials were concerned with facilitating member bank borrowing. After the 
onset of the financial crisis in 1931, the Reserve Banks agreed to " 
pursue a liberal policy toward member banks in difficulty; such banks 
should be encouraged to borrow freely from the Reserve Banks ...." 
(6, p. 69) Goldenweiser (20, p. 160) describes the use of this policy: 
" ... at many Federal Reserve Banks the management went as far 
as the law permitted and interpreted it rather liberally in 
efforts to help out member banks known to be fundamentally 
solvent but in difficulties owing to the drop in prices and the 
loss of public confidence in the banks. Much work of this sort 
was done by the Reserve Banks for banks which were scraping the 
bottom of the barrel for acceptable assets on which to borrow 
from the Federal Reserve. There is in many districts a warm 
friendship for the Federal Reserve for the timely and generous 
help received during that trying time." 
It might be argued that statements such as these reveal a Federal 
Reserve policy of encouraging borrowing by individual banks facing bank 
runs and similar difficulties, but not necessarily a general policy of 
boosting borrowing in the aggregate. Friedman and Schwartz suggest that 
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the use of direct pressure (lAich had been unsuccessfully employed in 
1929 to discourage borrowing) in reverse could have been used to stimulate 
total bank borrowings. I cannot agree. Federal Reserve pronouncements 
encouraging bank appearances at the discount window would have influenced 
banks little at a time when there was a dearth of suitable loan customers 
and the business outlook was bleak. 
Borrowing could also have been increased, Friedman and Schwartz 
maintain, by having made it more profitable for member banks to do so. 
This could have been done by setting the discount rate at a level below 
yields on Treasury securities. In fact, the discount rate was less than 
the yields on Treasury notes and bonds in late 1931, so presumably 
Friedman and Schwartz are suggesting its reduction to a point below the 
yield on Treasury bills. In my opinion this was not a feasible alterna­
tive. The traditional response to a gold outflow was to raise discount 
rates. This response was expected of the United States in late 1931. Had 
tradition been flagrantly violated and rates kept low in order to foster 
member bank borrowing, international confidence in American ability and 
desire to maintain the gold standard might have suffered a severe blow. 
There is little doubt that the gold drain would have accelerated; and, in 
all probability, the increased outflow would have more than offset Reserve 
Bank efforts to stimulate member bank borrowing. 
Purchases of acceptances 
Friedman and Schwartz assert that an increase in Federal Reserve 
holdings of acceptances was an alternative to the purchase of government 
securities and it was one which would have made no inroads on free gold 
since acceptances were acceptable as collateral for Reserve notes whereas 
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governments were not. System policy with regard to acceptances was to set 
its buying rate and purchase all bills offered at that rate. The Reserve 
Banks did not encourage sales of acceptances to them in late 1931, 
Friedman and Schwartz maintain, because their buying rate had risen to a 
point above the open market rate on acceptances. They argue that it was 
irrelevant to System holdings of acceptances that the buying rate was below 
the discount rate. It appears that this analysis is correct — it was the 
relationship between the buying rate and the open market rate at this 
time rather than between the buying rate and the discount rate which 
determined A^. The reasoning leading to this conclusion, and some of its 
implications are developed below. We employ a type of analysis similar 
to that used by Goldfeld and Kane (22) in their study of the determinants 
of member bank borrowing. 
Assume that at time t a bank is faced with a certain need for 
reserves in order to meet deposit withdrawals and loan demand between t 
and t+1. We will term this reserve need ^ N. To obtain these reserves 
the bank may either borrow or sell acceptances. We define A A, as before, 
as the change in bank holdings of acceptances. Hence: 
(5.3) A N = B + A A 
The cost of acquiring the necessary reserves is a function of the 
cost of borrowing and the cost of selling acceptances. If borrowing 
occurs, the cost is defined by r B where r is the discount rate. The 
cost of selling acceptances, however, depends on to whom they are sold. 
If acceptances are sold to the Reserve Banks, the cost is: 
(5.3) [-r^ + (ip-r^)] A A = -r^ A A 
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where : 
r^ = market rate on acceptances 
r^ = buying rate on acceptances at Reserve Banks 
If the buying rate were 2 1/2 percent, for example, but the market rate 
were 5 percent, an acceptance bought on the market at 95 could be sold 
to the System at 97.5 (approximately) on the same day. The loss from 
selling the acceptance to a Reserve Bank rather than holding it to matur­
ity would therefore be only 2 1/2 percent-
If an acceptance is sold on the market, the loss from the sale is 
expressed by: 
(5.4) -r^ A A 
It becomes clear that if A N is given, and if the banker has decided 
to sell a certain amount of acceptances in obtaining AN, he will choose 
whether to sell these acceptances to the Reserve Banks or on the market 
depending on the relationship between r^ and r^. If r^ < r^, the accept­
ances will be sold to the System; otherwise, they will be placed on the 
market. Friedman and Schwartz are therefore correct to stress the 
importance of this relationship in determining System holdings of accept­
ances . 
In some circumstances, however, the relationship between r^ and r^ 
becomes important as well. If r^ < r^, the relevant cost of obtaining a 
certain quantity of reserves, A N, is given by: 
(5.5) r^B - rp aA 
and if r„ > r , the relevant cost becomes: 
r A 
(5.6) r^B - r^ A A 
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If minimizing the cost of obtaining these reserves is the banker's only 
concern, he will either borrow or sell acceptances depending on which is 
less costly, but he will not do both. The solution to the constrained 
cost minimization problem will be, in linear programming terminology, a 
corner solution. Consequently, even when r^ < r^, if r^ is at the same 
time > r , the profit-maximizing bank would borrow rather than sell 
D 
acceptances to the System. 
Of course, there are factors other than relative cost which determine 
a bank's choice between these two methods of obtaining reserves, as well 
as the total amount of reserves needed. Some of these are accounted for 
in the model. For example, the greater the loan rate, the greater the 
reserve need since the banker will desire to lend more. Concern for 
liquidity and soundness will limit the extent to which the banker is 
willing to reduce his acceptance holdings and to increase borrowings. 
However, if the banker desires to minimize the cost of obtaining reserves, 
even if he does so subject to several constraints similar to those 
mentioned, the following relationships should hold: 
(5.7) as/arg < 0 
(5.8) > 0 if rp > 
(5.9) oB/afp > 0 if > rp 
(5.10) > 0 
(5.11) a^A/arg > 0 
(5.12) a^A/arp < 0 if rp < r 
(5.13) < 0 if r^ < r. 
(5.14) azA/azP > 0 
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Reducing the Federal Reserve buying rate to a point below the market rate 
should therefore have enhanced sales of acceptances to the Reserve Banks, 
and at the same time reduced borrowings. 
This hypothesis was tested for the third quarter of 1931 by substi­
tuting for the actual market rate of 1.73 percent a hypothetical buying 
rate of .5 percent. The use of this alternative assumption reduced the 
predicted values of both A and B by exactly the same amount — $115 
million each. Member banks would have sold acceptances to the System, and 
used the proceeds to reduce borrowing to the extent of $115 million, 
according to the model. No change in was predicted. 
If the increase in System holdings of bills and discounts is pre­
cisely equal to the amount of acceptances sold plus the increase in 
borrowings by member banks (Mp + = /^ - M), this test indicates that 
Reserve Bank holdings of eligible paper would have been unaltered by the 
reduction in the buying rate to .5 percent in late 1931. Free gold would 
therefore have suffered no deterioration. However, note that the pre­
dicted value of loans and of the money supply show no immediate increase, 
since the model predicts a simple substitution of acceptance sales for 
borrowings. Of course, due to the rise in free reserves, banks might sub­
sequently have lent more freely. Moreover, any sales of acceptances to 
the Reserve Banks by those other than banks would have contributed to an 
expansion of reserves and deposits. It nevertheless appears that the 
reduction of the buying rate to .5 percent would have been an extremely 
ineffective way to stimulate the economy, and it would surely have been 
impossible to lower the rate much more. 
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Even if this hypothetical policy had been found to be very effective, 
its potential usage was limited. It was confined by the volume of acceptances 
held by the public. In December, 1931, there were only $418 million in 
acceptances held outside the Federal Reserve System. Given the traditional 
System policy of purchasing only "seasoned" bills, those which had been 
in the market for some time and were approaching maturity, the volume of 
bills which could have been added to Reserve Bank portfolios was consid­
erably less than $418 million. Of course, a reduction in the System's 
buying rate might have fostered an increase in the supply of acceptances. 
However, it seems certain that the lack of available acceptances would 
still have prevented this policy from being a viable alternative to the 
purchase of government securities. 
There was a potential disadvantage to a policy of maintaining low 
buying rates which, in my opinion, outweighed any possible advantages. 
This was the contingency that reduced buying rates might have spurred 
withdrawals of gold, particularly by the Bank of France. Villard 
(50, p. 733) disagrees, maintaining that: 
"  . . .  t h e  v e r y  o r t h o d o x y  o f  t h e  B a n k  o f  F r a n c e  w o u l d  h a v e  
caused it to be particularly concerned with the discount rate 
and the open market policy to the exclusion of the acceptance 
situation. It is quite possible, therefore, that if the dis­
count rate and open market policy had been kept at a level high 
enough to appear conservative to the Bank of France, maintenance 
of the acceptance portfolio might not have upset the French." 
This argument is not particularly convincing. From late October, 
1931, until the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Reserve Bank buying 
rate was above the market rate. During this interval, Reserve Bank 
holdings of acceptances for foreign correspondents rose rapidly, from 
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$99 million to $312 million. It seems likely that the willingness of 
foreigners to hold these American acceptances rather than withdrawing 
their balances in gold was a function of their increased profitability as 
well as of the confidence engendered by Reserve Bank willingness to raise 
rates. The probability that lower buying rates would have produced the 
conversion of some foreign-held acceptances into gold seems very great 
indeed. 
My conclusion is that a reduction in Reserve Bank acceptance rates 
would have been an ineffective and dangerous alternative to the purchase 
of government securities in late 1931. 
Other Aspects of the Friedman-Schwartz Argument 
Points 1, 2, 3 and 5^ of the Friedman-Schwartz discussion, are more 
qualitative in nature than the others we have discussed, and are primarily 
devoted to subjective estimation of the degree of Federal Reserve anxiety 
over free gold. In this section we present some observations on these 
more qualitative aspects of the Friedman-Schwartz analysis. 
To demonstrate the lack of widespread concern over, or even knowledge 
of, free gold, Friedman and Schwartz (18, p. 401) tell us that "the 
earliest published full-dress discussion of free gold during the 1929-33 
contraction" appeared in September, 1930. This statement is so carefully 
phrased that it is rather misleading. 
In a March, 1930, article, Benjamin Anderson (3) warned that free 
gold "though adequate, is not superabundant, when all circumstances are 
^See pp. 8-9. 
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taken into account." (3, p. 13) Anderson maintained that cheap money 
policy would produce deterioration of the free gold position- This was 
the first article written during the 1929-1933 contraction that I have 
found, b-'jit- perhaps Friedman and Schwartz could legitimately contend that 
it was not a "full-dress discussion" (18, p. 401) of the free gold problem. 
There were, however, published discussions of free gold which 
appeared immediately prior to the beginning of the downturn — one written 
by Burgess (11) in February, 1929, and one in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
for September, 1928 (49, 1928, pp. 613-14). Burgess makes it clear that 
free gold was a continuous factor in the determination of Reserve policy. 
He forecasts that free gold might decline somewhat in future months, as 
gold withdrawals and increases in currency in circulation were likely. 
However, he states, "the present gold position does not offer cause for 
alarm." We have been finding ways to economize on gold and "if necessary, 
more means of gold economy can be found, even if substantial modifications 
in our banking law should be required." (11, p. 24) Similar sentiments 
are expressed in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (49, 1928) where it is 
explained that free gold currently exceeds its usual level due to 
abnormally large holdings of eligible paper in Reserve Banks, and would be 
much less under normal circumstances. Writing in January, 1931, Beckhart 
warned that free gold holdings were small "and under conditions that might 
develop could drop to a point that would require a reversal of the present 
'cheap money policy.'" (8, p. 102) The concept of free gold was becoming 
more and more well-publicized during the period following the crash, and 
although its level was not a cause for alarm prior to the autumn of 1931, 
it was being closely watched. 
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According to Friedman and Schwartz, System documents reveal that the 
level of free gold was "not ... a source of concern to the Board" 
(18, p. 401), even during the fall of 1931. This argument is given force 
by the statement of the Board in its November, 1931, Bulletin (49, 1931, 
pp. 603-04). During September and October, the U. S. had lost $730 million 
in gold, and currency outstanding had risen by $390 million. It would seem 
that if free gold were ever a concern, it would have been so at this point. 
However, the Board painted an extremely rosy picture of the situation. 
The System's reserve ratio (the ratio of total reserves to deposit and 
note liabilities) could be increased if gold certificates in circulation 
were replaced by Reserve notes, the Board reassured its readers. It is 
true that this policy would have increased the reserve ratio, but it would 
not have increased free gold, as the Board itself had pointed out in 1928 
(49, 1928, pp. 613-14). Moreover, the Board declared that the level of 
free gold did not limit the ability of the Reserve Banks to meet further 
demands for gold and for currency, because when such demands arose, more 
eligible paper would be pledged. This statement implies a tight money 
policy of forcing banks to obtain reserves by discounting, rather than the 
provision of reserves through open market operations. Finally, the offi­
cial statement maintained that free gold could be increased by reducing 
the vault cash of Federal Reserve Banks. This policy had already been 
utilized to the extent of $100 thousand during the six weeks ending on 
October 28. 
It seems reasonably certain that this statement cannot be taken at 
face value leading to the conclusion that Reserve officials were not con-
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earned over free gold. Whatever Reserve officials' real degree of anxiety 
over the free gold position, their statement was obviously written for the 
purpose of reassuring the American public and foreign investors that the 
gold reserves of the U. S. were adequate to meet the crisis. It was 
clearly impossible to have done otherwise. Had the Board written that the 
level of free gold was rapidly declining, and that it could not pursue a 
vigorous easy money policy without causing a further deterioration or even 
elimination of free gold, the repercussions would probably have been 
dramatic — panic-stricken gold withdrawals and a surge in currency 
hoarding.^ 
The evidence suggests that concern over free gold was an important 
restraining factor on Reserve System policy between September, 1931, and 
February, 1932. Such concern was surely not the factor preventing monetary 
authorities from pursuing large-scale open market operations prior to that 
time, however. In March, 1932, the Board itself stated that, "until 
recent months, collateral requirements were not an important element in 
the situation." (49, 1932, p. 144) 
One might wonder why, if the System regarded free gold as a serious 
handicap to a desired policy, it did not push for the changes embodied in 
the Glass-Steagall Act until early February, 1932, at which time Harrison 
wrote to Senator Glass suggesting such legislation. In fact, according 
1 
Harris seems to agree in this: "In 1928-29, the authorities put 
the emphasis on free gold, because in that manner they could minimize the 
amount of reserves available for further expansion; but in 1930-31 they 
were to regret the publicity given to this view, for they now had to 
minimize the importance of losses of free gold." (27, p. 379) 
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to Friedman and Schwartz, the real push for the legislation came from the 
White House and the Treasury. During House hearings on the Goldsborough 
bill in April, 1932, Governor Harrison stated that the rather passive 
policy pursued after early 1930 was due partly to "the fact that we did 
not have at that time the Glass-Steagall bill," to which Goldsborough 
responded, "You could have gotten it." (47, p. 488) However, two pages 
later, Goldsborough asserted that the bill could not have passed the 
Senate without the one-year limitation attached to it (47, p. 490). This 
latter statement suggests that until emergency conditions became imminently 
clear to that legislative body, they might have refused to pass the bill 
at all. Hence, one reason for the System's reticence in requesting 
legislation may have been a feeling that it was a hopeless cause. 
Goldenweiser (20, p. 160) concurs in this view: 
"The System could be criticized for not advocating vigorously 
the necessary changes in the law, but the prospect of obtaining 
such legislation was not promising as long as Congress was 
dominated by traditional conceptions about the issue of 
currency." 
He adds, however, that it was not only pessimism as to the success of a 
request for legislation which produced the System's passivity: "Nor was 
the System's grasp of the issues involved so clear and widespread as it 
became in later years." (?-0, p. 160) 
If the System x ere truly concerned over lack of ability to use govern­
ment securities as collateral in late 1931, one would expect that when such 
a policy were authorized, government securities would have been immediately 
pledged. Such was not the case. No government securities were pledged 
until May 5, 1932. According to Villard (50, p. 736); 
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" ... it seems clear from the failure immediately to utilize the 
powers of the Glass-Steagall Act that the authorities, previous 
to the passage of the Act, were not solely restrained by fear 
of inadequate free gold resulting from expansionary actions on 
their part." 
The temporary nature of the Glass-Steagall legislation may have 
inhibited the System from using its new authority to the full. Speaking 
during the hearings on the Goldsborough bill, Harriton (47, p. 493) 
stated: 
"I do not think there is any necessity for further legislation 
at the present time, if we could assume that the provisions of 
the Glass-Steagall bill are permanent, rather than limited to 
one year. That is unavoidably a restraining influence, certain­
ly, on some of the managers of the System." 
Perhaps because the legislation was temporary, the System settled on a 
very restrictive rule-of-thumb for the pledging of government securities 
as collateral. 
"In determining upon a formula ... the Board decided that in 
existing circumstances when the margin between (1) total cash 
reserves of the Reserve Banks (in excess of the 35 percent 
against deposits) plus eligible paper at the 12 Federal Reserve 
Banks, and (2) Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation shall 
fall below $400,000,000, the Reserve Banks shall be authorized 
to pledge a sufficient amount of United States Government 
securities with the Federal Reserve Agents to release enough 
gold to bring this margin up to the $400,000,000 level." 
(49, 1932, p. 286) 
This was indeed a cautious policy, for the margin of $400 million had to 
be used to provide collateral against Reserve notes not in circulation and 
to satisfy the requirements of the redemption fund. These additional 
requirements could, and did, reduce free gold to very low levels — 
substantially below $400 million. 
My conclusion is that the free gold position exerted an important 
restraining influence on Federal Reserve authorities after Britain 
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suspended gold payments, but I agree with Friedman and Schwartz that it 
was not the only factor which prevented the System from embarking on a 
large open market campaign. Clay Anderson (6), whose book is based pri­
marily on the views of System officials as recorded in the minutes and the 
proceedings of groups such as the Open Market Policy Conference and the 
Conference of Reserve Bank Presidents, mentions several additional reasons 
for the growing opposition to security purchases. Some officials who had 
previously favored additional purchases thought that member banks, due to 
anxiety over their liquidity, would now hold the funds so created as 
excess reserves thus making the program ineffective. Furthermore, 
"several presidents were becoming seriously concerned over the 
reserve position of their Reserve Banks .... Sudden demands by 
member banks might prove embarrassing if the System's resources 
were tied up in Government securities." (6, p. 67 
This was a concern closely related to that over free gold, but it was 
primarily apprehension over the liquidity of the Reserve Banks themselves. 
Certain Reserve Bank presidents seemed to view their institutions as 
ordinary banks with the liquidity problems of such banks, rather than as 
central banks. Indeed, some Reserve Bank presidents were so concerned that 
they refused to participate in further purchases. Finally, there were 
still some System officials who adhered to the view that the depression 
had resulted mainly from non-monetary causes such as overproduction and 
excess capacity, which could not be remedied by a cheap money policy. 
They had opposed open market purchases all along, and continued to do so 
in late 1931. 
Anderson does assign prominent place to free gold among the reasons 
for the passive policy of late 1931, as did Governor Harrison of the New 
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York Reserve Bank, who had vigorously advocated larger open market pur­
chases between 1929 and the autumn of 1931. In April, 1932, Harrison told 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency: 
" ... I think we were wise, through the months of September, 
October, and November and even December [1931], in not pursuing 
a vigorous policy of Government purchases .. for three reasons: 
First, because of the fact that we were having a raid on our 
gold from abroad; second, currency was going up at a terrific 
rate -- both of those things would have offset anything we 
could have done by purchasing governments; and the third reason 
was, and it is a practical reason, that because of the technical 
limitations in the law we did not have enough free gold to 
justify our doing it."^ (47, p. 478) 
One final question remains: Was the large-scale purchase program 
begun only because of pressure from Congressional critics as Friedman and 
Schwartz (18) assert, and if not, why was it undertaken? Whitney (51) provides 
the most unique answer to this question we have found. She suggests that: 
" ... the fact that the Treasury had been forced to increase 
its indebtedness ever since the close of the fiscal year 1930 
may have been one factor inducing the Reserve Banks to purchase 
one billion dollars' worth of government securities in the 
spring of 1932. But the fiction that this measure was started 
to aid the money market was maintained by having the Reserve 
banks buy from the market instead of from the Treasury direct­
ly ...." (51, p. 63) 
Whitney's theory of conspiracy between the Reserve Banks and the Treasury 
is interesting, but highly improbable. The majority of those who have 
discussed the reasons for the policy change of 1932 accept unquestioningly 
the Board's contention that, having been freed from restraining legal 
requirements, the System readily embarked on the policy it had considered 
desirable for months. It is doubtful that any single-cause explanation 
for the program is adequate — either that given by the Board or that 
expounded by Friedman and Schwartz. 
^My underlining. 
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Friedman and Schwartz assert that the open market campaign did not 
begin until six weeks after passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. This is 
true only if one disregards purchases of $25 million per week which began 
on the first of March. Purchases of this size were, in fact, very large 
by the standards of the day, and beginning as they did only a few days 
after passage of the Act, it is hard to deny that the legislation did lead 
to a change of policy. It is not clear whether pressure from Congress 
also influenced monetary policy decisions in March and early April, but 
in mid-April a rather strange coincidence developed. Hearings on the 
Goldsborough bill, which provided that the monetary authorities be 
directed to raise the price level to some specific point (the 1926 level 
was frequently mentioned) were underway on April 13 and 14. Not surpris­
ingly, Reserve officials were unalterably opposed to any such proposal, and 
they must have been rather apprehensive as to its outcome, for the bill 
had quite a number of adherents, particularly in the House. Governor 
Harrison was to testify at committee hearings on the bill on April 13. 
On April 12, the Open Market Policy Conference decided to step up its 
rate of purchase to $100 million per week. During his testimony, Harrison 
made numerous references to the dramatic policy change upon which Reserve 
officials had agreed, although he did not specify what the new rate of 
purchase was to be. This sequence of events gives support to the Friedman-
Schwartz (18) contention that Congressional pressure influenced the System's 
decisions. The acceleration in the rate of purchase was very likely an 
attempt to head-off the prospects for passage of the Goldsborough bill. 
Congressional pressure was not, however, the primary factor responsible 
for the initiation of the program in March. 
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Friedman and Schwartz (18) imply that security purchases ended in July, 
1932, because Congress had adjourned, and freed from pressure by that body. 
Reserve officials no longer felt obligated to pursue a policy in which they 
had little faith. Our evidence leads to a different conclusion. Anderson 
(6, p. 70) states that during the open market campaign, "the immediate 
target of open market operations shifted from a certain quantity of 
purchases to building up and maintaining excess reserves." In June, 1932, 
System officials agreed to use open market policy to maintain excess 
reserves at a level of $250 to $300 million. During the second half of 
1931, imports of gold and a return flow of currency produced a substantial 
expansion of excess reserves. The target was therefore achieved with no 
further increase in Reserve Bank security holdings. The program was ended 
because the target was met, not, in my opinion, because of a lapse in 
Congressional criticism of monetary policy. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Professors Friedman and Schwartz place major responsibility for the 
intensity and duration of the Great Depression with policymakers in 
Washington, D. C. — but not with the creators of fiscal policy, vrtio have 
so frequently received the blame. Friedman and Schwartz believe that 
officials of the /ederal Reserve System showed even greater ineptitude 
during those years of crisis, and their argument has greatly influenced 
a number of contemporary historians. "How different," the foremost 
modern-quantity theorist laments, 
"the history of that fateful dozen years might have been if 
the money stock had grown steadily at its average rate of 
2 1/2 per cent per year ... instead of first falling by one-
third from 1929 to 1933 and then doubling from 1933 to 1941." 
(18, p. 545) 
This paper has dealt with monetary policy during one small segment 
of this protracted economic slump — the period beginning with the British 
departure from gold on September 21, 1931, and ending with the passage of 
the Glass-Steagall Act on February 27, 1932. It has been our purpose to 
ascertain whether System authorities were so constrained during this inter­
val by legal requirements pertaining to collateral for Federal Reserve 
notes that they could not have pursued a more active policy. Such was 
the official System argument. Friedman and Schwartz contend that the 
supposed free gold problem resulting from these anachronistic legal 
requirements was a rationalization rather than a legitimate reason for the 
insufficiency and inappropriateness of the policy pursued. They suggest 
that open market purchases of $1 billion could and should have been under­
taken, and that an operation of that size would have been sufficient to 
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maintain stability of the money stock — a most crucial requirement for 
deterring economic instability in their opinion. 
Evidence presented in this study suggests that, if Reserve System 
officials were unalterably committed to the objective of maintaining free 
gold at some positive level, the attainment of this objective was incon­
sistent with the adoption of large-scale open market purchases in late 
1931. A shortage of free gold was a highly-probable consequence of a 
vigorous open market policy. This conclusion was derived by using a 
rather basic model of bank portfolio behavior to predict bank borrowings 
and acceptance holdings, in conjunction with specific assumptions concern­
ing the effect of a hypothetical security purchase on other determinants 
of free gold. Interestingly, the same conclusion results from the 
employment of these assumptions with the Friedman-Schwartz predictions for 
borrowings and acceptance holdings. 
The results obtained in Chapter V also suggest that a $1 billion 
security purchase would have been insufficient to prevent continued deter­
ioration of the money stock, although it would, of course, have lessened 
the rate of decline. Had monetary authorities set as their first priority 
the provision of a stable or growing money supply, it seems clear that 
free gold would have become nonexistent or negative. 
Other alternatives which Friedman and Schwartz considered viable 
solutions to a free gold shortage were found to be vastly overrated. The 
reduction of till money at Reserve Banks to the minimum level necessary 
for continued operation would have increased free gold, but not suffi­
ciently to support such a sizeable open market purchase. It was argued 
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that the encouragement of member bank borrowings by the use of direct 
pressure would have been of little avail, in light of existing economic 
conditions; and that it was impossible to provide such encouragement 
through reductions in the discount rate so long as the U. S. was firmly 
committed to maintaining the gold standard. The potential effect of the 
third alternative, purchases of acceptances rather than government 
securities, was investigated through the use of the bank-behavior model, 
and was found to have no immediate effect on free gold or System holdings 
of eligible paper -- or on the money supply. It was therefore concluded 
that this was a very weak policy instrument. Moreover, due to the 
limited availability of acceptances outside Federal Reserve Banks, it 
could not have been pursued to any great extent. 
It seems, then, that a lack of free gold did impose a serious 
constraint on the System's ability to actively engage in open market 
operations during the autumn and winter of 1931. Since this was the only 
truly available instrument for pursuing an easy money policy, the conclu­
sion follows that there was little that monetary authorities could have 
done to prevent the precipitate drop in the money stock which occurred 
during those months. System policy was justifiable at least for this 
small portion of the depression period. 
These conclusions are drawn without regard to what considerations 
actually determined the policy decisions of late 1931. À free gold 
shortage would have likely resulted from Reserve Bank purchases of $1 
billion; but this is not to say that anxiety over this contingency was 
the factor determining Federal Reserve policy. From the writings of 
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System officials, it seems clear that the deteriorating level of free gold 
had an important effect on the decisions made; but there were additional 
reasons for the opposition to open market purchases which had nothing to 
do with free gold. Some Reserve Bank presidents viewed this tool as an 
ineffective weapon for dealing with depression in general, and would 
have voted against open market operations regardless of the free gold 
position. Concern for the liquidity of their individual banks was upper­
most in the minds of other Reserve Bank officials. Finally, a sense of 
helplessness as the depression deepened may have fostered a paralysis of 
policy. 
Whatever the real reasons for the decisions made during the closing 
months of 1931 -- whether the System actually regarded free gold as a 
barrier to a dynamic policy or this argument was only rationalization for 
an inactive policy which would have been pursued in any case — the policy 
was not inappropriate. Given the legal collateral requirements which 
resulted in unusually low levels for free gold during those months, and a 
System objective of preventing the complete elimination of that quantity, 
it was impossible for monetary authorities to have done much mora to ease 
the country's economic miseries. 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a list of the symbols most frequently used in this 
study and their definitions; 
1. G = free gold 
f 
2. Rp = total reserves of Federal Reserve Banks = gold + lawful money 
3. Gg = gold required as collateral against Federal Reserve notes 
4. = total deposit liabilities of Federal Reserve Banks = 
»M + »G + »N 
5. Ep = eligible paper pledged as collateral against Federal Reserve 
notes 
6. = Federal Reserve notes issued to Reserve Banks 
7. = member bank reserves (deposits) with Federal Reserve Banks 
8. Bp = bills discounted and advances made by Reserve Banks 
9. Ap = bills bought by Reserve Banks 
10. Gg = U. S. Government securities held by Reserve Banks 
11. MG = monetary gold stock 
12. 0 = other Reserve Bank credit + Treasury currency - Treasury 
cash - other Federal Reserve accounts 
13. G = currency in circulation = 
14. Dg = Treasury deposits with Federal Reserve Banks 
15. = non-member bank deposits with Federal Reserve Banks 
,16. Cp = Federal Reserve notes in circulation 
17. G^ = other currency in circulation 
18. = Federal Reserve notes held by Reserve Banks and by the U. S. 
Treasury 
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19. M = money stock = C + D 
20. D = total bank deposits = DD^ + TD 
21. E [ ] = expected value of bracketed term 
22. TT = profits 
23. A = bank holdings of acceptances 
24. Ug = bank holdings of Treasury bills 
25. S = bank loans to brokers and dealers 
26. Ug = bank holdings of Treasury bonds 
27. = bank holdings of Treasury notes 
28. M = bank holdings of state and local government bonds 
29. R = bank holdings of railroad bonds 
30. U = bank holdings of utility bonds 
31. P = bank holdings of commercial paper 
32. L = = bank loans to customers = deposits created in the 
process of granting loans 
33. B = borrowings at Reserve Banks 
34. r r , r , r,. r„, Tj,, or r , = rate of 
B G N L 
return on A, Ug, S, U^, U^, M, R, U, P, L or D^, B 
35. E = excess reserves 
36. V = vault cash 
37. TD = time deposits 
38. DDj^ = net demand deposits 
39. RR = required reserves against demand and time deposits 
40. V = 1 - required reserve ratio for demand deposits 
41. s = 1 - required reserve ratio on time deposits 
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42. Dp = DDjjj - = demand deposits other than those created in the 
process of granting loans 
43. a = minimum acceptable short-term asset-deposit ratio 
44. K = capital accounts 
45. ~ other bank assets 
45. p = desired risk-asset ratio 
47. = U. S. Government securities available to the private sector 
48. r^  = buying rate on acceptances at Federal Reserve Banks 
49.  ^= quantity of reserves needed between t and t+1 
50. t = present time 
